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Abstract 
This dissertation is about three types of paternity: non-consensual, deceitful and 
misattributed paternity. It is argued that these types of paternity are a modern reality 
that result in serious practical and legal consequences for all parties involved, but 
particularly for the father and child. They do not sit comfortably within the current 
legal framework on paternity which is too rigid, unclear or outdated to resolve issues 
that arise, and perhaps result in inequitable outcomes. In the light of this, several 
recommendations are provided to resolve these issues, most taking the form of 
statutory amendments.  
 
While tort actions have traditionally often been commercial in nature, recent 
developments demonstrate that certain conduct taking place within a domestic context 
can also attract liability. For example, deceit and negligent misstatement claims to 
recover “damage” caused by misattributed paternity have had varying degrees of 
success in England, Australia and Canada.  A successful claim could potentially be 
made in New Zealand, although in certain limited circumstances, claims should be 
barred on public policy grounds.  
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1 Chapter 1 Introduction 
I Introduction 
A Dissertation topic 
Parenthood is a complex area of law and of life. Ideally, both parents knowingly and 
consensually conceive a child together, either through natural or artificial conception,
1
 
as this can simplify both the practical and legal consequences for the mother, father 
and the child. However, in reality there are many complex scenarios in which a child 
may be conceived that can result in a practical, legal, and moral minefield. Some of 
the most complex scenarios are those where the paternity of a child is non-consensual, 
deceitful, or misattributed as they raise complex issues for all the parties involved. 
This dissertation explores these scenarios and the various issues that arise.  
 
In simple terms, this dissertation analyses four types of paternity:  
(1) non-consensual artificial paternity;  
(2) non-consensual natural paternity; 
(3) deceitful natural paternity; and 
(4) misattributed paternity.  
 
Non-consensual artificial paternity results from the use of a male’s semen (or embryos 
created using his semen) by a female in an assisted human reproductive procedure 
(AHR procedure) without his consent to conceive a child. This type of paternity can 
occur when a couple agree to store semen samples or embryos for future use but then 
separate, and after the separation the female party goes ahead with an AHR procedure 
using the samples without the knowledge of her former partner and conceives a child. 
Alternatively, the couple may have begun fertility treatment using the samples and 
separate in the course of treatment, and after the separation the female party continues 
treatment without the knowledge of her former partner and conceives a child. 
 
Non-consensual natural paternity results from the unplanned conception of a child 
after consensual sexual intercourse. The conception of the child may have resulted 
from a lack of contraception, faulty contraception or simple miscommunication. 
Similarly, deceitful natural paternity results from consensual sexual intercourse 
although it is a deliberate deceitful act by the child’s biological mother that resulted in 
the conception of the child. She may have lied about her use of the contraceptive pill, 
pricked the condom, lied about infertility, or collected discarded semen (for example 
out of a used condom) and inseminated it without the knowledge or consent of the 
biological father. Similarly, semen could collected in the course of oral sex and be 
inseminated without the knowledge or consent of the biological father. 
                                                 
1
 Natural conception means conception resulting from sexual intercourse and artificial conception 
 means conception resulting from an AHR procedure. 
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Finally, misattributed paternity results from the incorrect identification of the child’s 
biological father by the child’s biological mother either mistakenly, recklessly or 
intentionally. In scenarios involving misattributed paternity, the non-biological father 
and child are unaware of the fact they do not share a biological relationship until such 
a time when the true paternity of the child is discovered or revealed.
2
  
B  Dissertation statement 
It is argued that non-consensual, deceitful and misattributed paternity is a modern 
reality that has serious practical and legal consequences for all parties involved, but 
particularly for the father and the child. These types of paternity do not sit 
comfortably within the current legal framework on paternity which is too rigid, 
unclear or outdated to resolve issues that arise, and perhaps result in inequitable 
outcomes. Therefore, changes need to be made to this legal framework. 
C Structure of this dissertation 
Firstly, the current legal framework on paternity in New Zealand is outlined and the 
legal principles used to resolve paternity related issues are identified. The four 
different types of paternity outlined above are then analysed, using the same five step 
analytical framework.
3
  
(1) At the start of each chapter, the type of paternity to be analysed is clearly 
defined. 
(2) In order to put each type of paternity into context, hypothetical scenarios 
containing a range of fact patterns are provided. Each hypothetical scenario is 
analysed using the current legal framework to determine whether, upon the 
birth of the child, the male in each scenario becomes the legal father of the 
child, or in the case of misattributed paternity, should remain the legal father 
of the child.  
(3) The main principles reflected in the current legal framework and resulting 
legal outcome are then identified.  
(4) Consideration is then given to whether the current legal framework and 
resulting legal outcome are satisfactory. Arguments are made out based on 
various principles. New Zealand legislation and case law is drawn upon, 
although supplementary legislation and case law from other countries is used 
where there is a lack of New Zealand authority on the relevant issue.  
(5) Finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations made.  
                                                 
2
 Misattributed paternity can also result where babies are accidentally or negligently swapped at birth. 
However, these scenarios are not discussed in this dissertation.  
3
 Non-consensual natural paternity and deceitful paternity are analysed concurrently within the same 
chapter as similar issues arise in regards to both types of paternity.  
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This dissertation then considers deceit and negligent misstatement claims in the 
context of misattributed paternity. The central issue in this chapter is whether a male 
can bring a successful claim in New Zealand against the mother of the child to claim 
“damage” caused as a result of being incorrectly identified as the father of the child. 
Claims of this nature have emerged in other countries within the common law 
jurisdictions, namely, England, Australia and Canada, with varying degrees of 
success. While such a claim has not yet come before a New Zealand court, it is 
arguably inevitable that one will arise in future. Therefore, this is an important issue 
that needs to be addressed.  
 
While non-consensual and deceitful paternity could also attract tort liability, this 
dissertation concentrates solely on tort liability for misattributed paternity as no deceit 
or negligent misstatement claims for non-consensual or deceitful paternity have 
emerged in the common law jurisdictions. However, examples of potential tort claims 
that could arise are briefly discussed. 
D Purpose of this dissertation 
This dissertation has both a practical and academic purpose. Firstly, to provide clear 
practical recommendations in the form of statutory amendments or new statutory 
provisions. The recommendations are based on legal analysis of the current law and 
are tested against a set of legal principles. They could be the subject of further 
research or recommendation by the Law Commission, considered or implemented in 
policies developed by the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Social Development and 
Inland Revenue, or used by a Member of Parliament to bring about legislative reform.  
 
While this dissertation aims to be practical, it is not based on the assumption that it 
provides all the answers to the many complex legal issues that are discussed. Further 
research into this area of the law is needed as many of the issues analysed in this 
dissertation have not been explored in New Zealand academic literature. This 
dissertation aims to add to and hopefully generate further academic debate and 
research in New Zealand and overseas. 
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II  New Zealand legal framework on paternity 
 
This dissertation draws primarily on five Acts that contain provisions which 
determine paternity or relate to various aspects of paternity, namely: the Status of 
Children Act 1969, the Family Proceedings Act 1980, the Care of Children Act 2004, 
the Child Support Act 1991 and the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 
2004. In addition, this dissertation draws on New Zealand case law that has 
interpreted and applied various provisions of these Acts. 
A Fathers as legal parents and legal guardians  
Paternity means the state of being one’s father. In law, a father can be both a legal 
parent of a child and a legal guardian of a child.4 The provisions in Part 1 of the Status 
of Children Act 1969 determine who are the legal parents of a naturally conceived 
child.
5
 Although there is no explicit statutory definition, the combined effect of the 
provisions in Part 1 is that the legal father of a child is his or her biological father.
6
  
 
There are several powers, duties, rights and responsibilities that flow from the status 
of being a legal father in regards to intestacy,
7
 family protection,
8
 citizenship,
9
 and 
child support.
10
 Guardianship can also flow from the status of being a legal father. 
Usually, legal fathers are joint guardians with the child’s mother unless she was 
neither married to or in a civil union with the child’s father at any time during the 
period beginning with the conception of the child, and ending with the birth of the 
child,
11
 nor living with the child’s father as a de facto partner at any time during that 
period.
12
 If a father is not a guardian by virtue of s 17 he can become the child’s legal 
guardian if he jointly registers his particulars as part of the child’s birth information 
with the child’s mother.13 If there is disagreement with the mother regarding 
guardianship, the father can apply to the Family Court to be appointed a guardian,
14
 
                                                 
4
 However, legal parenthood and legal guardianship are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, a father may 
solely be the child’s legal parent or legal guardian. 
5
 The only way this status can be altered in law is by the Adoption Act 1955, which reallocates legal 
parenthood further to a specified statutory scheme. 
6
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 7, s 8, and s 10; Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 2 as amended by 
schedule 3 of the Care of Children Act 2004. 
7
 Administration Act 1969, s 77. 
8
 Family Protection Act 1955, s 3. 
9
 Citizenship Act 1977, s 3. 
10
 Child Support Act 1991, s 7.  
11
 Care of Children Act 2004, s 17(2)(a). 
12
 Section 17(2)(b). 
13
 Section 18. 
14
 Section 19. 
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and the Court must appoint the father a guardian of the child unless to do so would be 
contrary to the child’s welfare and best interests.15  
B Establishing fathers as legal parents 
Section 8 of the Status of Children Act 1969 recognises five different types of 
evidence or proof of paternity:  
(1) a certified copy of the birth certificate showing the name of the father;  
(2) an instrument signed by the mother of a child and a person acknowledging he 
is the father; 
(3) an order made by a specified Court or public authority in a specified country 
outside New Zealand declaring a person to be the father of the child; 
(4) a paternity order within the meaning of the Domestic Proceedings Act 1968; 
and 
(5) a declaration of paternity made under section 10 of the Status of Children Act 
1969.  
A declaration of paternity is conclusive proof of paternity. The four remaining types 
of evidence are prima facie evidence of paternity only. 
 
The most common and straightforward way for a father to become the legal father of a 
child is for him to jointly acknowledge that he is the legal father of the child with the 
child’s mother and sign the child’s birth certificate, or an instrument acknowledging 
that he is the father. However, if there is uncertainty or disagreement as to the 
paternity of a child, either upon the child’s birth or later in the child’s life, a paternity 
order or a declaration of paternity will be necessary to establish who is the legal father 
of the child.  
 
The High Court or Family Court may make a declaration of paternity if it is proved to 
the Court's satisfaction that the relationship of father and child exists.
16
 Alternatively, 
the Court may make a declaration of non-paternity if it is proved to the Court's 
satisfaction that the relationship does not exist.
17
 The relationship referred to in s 10 is 
the legal relationship between the father and the child not the biological relationship 
between the father and the child.
18
 Both declarations are a judgment in rem and 
therefore binding on all subsequent proceedings. The Court’s ability to make 
declarations is not subject to time limitations as they can be made after the child, 
father, or both have died.   
 
                                                 
15
 Section 19(4)(a). 
16
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 10(2).  
17
 Section 10(3). 
18
 Hemmes v Young [2005] NZSC 47. 
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The Family Court may alternatively grant a paternity order in accordance with the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980.
19
 A paternity order is conclusive evidence of paternity 
for the purpose of maintenance liability only, and does not bind the parties in any 
other proceedings save to the extent that, if a paternity order is made, it amounts in 
those other proceedings to prima facie evidence of paternity.
20
 Unlike a declaration of 
paternity made under the Status of Children Act 1969, a paternity order can only be 
made in regards to an ex-nuptial child,
21
 and an application for a paternity order 
cannot be made after the expiration of six years from the birth of the child.
22
 Finally, 
the Court may alternatively make an order of non-paternity if it is satisfied that the 
respondent to the proceedings is not the father of the child.
23
  
 
In determining an application for a declaration of paternity or non-paternity, a 
statutory presumption of parenthood will apply depending on the relationship status 
between the mother of the child and the man alleged to be the father around the time 
of the child’s conception. Section 5 of the Status of Children Act 1969 provides that a 
man who is married to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth is presumed 
to the child’s legal father. Similarly, a man is presumed to be the legal father of a 
child born within 10 months of the end of his marriage to the child’s mother. In 
regards to de facto couples, opinion is divided as to whether the presumption of 
parenthood applies.
24
 While some commentators see the Status of Children 
Amendment Act 1987 (which applies to de facto partners as well as married couples) 
as widening the ambit of the Status of Children Act 1969,
25
 the majority do not.
26
 
Finally, the presumption is not conclusive and can be rebutted, with the onus on the 
father to produce rebuttal evidence. Every question of fact that arises in regards to the 
presumption is decided on a balance of probabilities.
27
 
 
More generally, every question of fact that arises in determining an application for a 
declaration of paternity or a paternity order must be decided on a balance of 
probabilities.
28
 In the leading judgment on the standard of proof in the context of 
                                                 
19
 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 51(1). 
20
 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 51(2).  
21
 Section 47(2). 
22
 Section 49(1). However s 49(2) provides various exceptions to this rule.  
23
 Section 51(1)(b). 
24
 The issue turns on the interpretation of s 5(1) of the Status of Children Act 1969 and ss 1 and 2 of the 
Status of Children Amendment Act 1987. 
25
 Henaghan et al Family Law in New Zealand (11ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) vol 1 at [6.504]. 
26
 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) at [111]. 
27
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 5(2).  
28
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 10(6).  
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paternity proceedings,
29
 Wild CJ did not accept all the evidence of the applicant 
mother, but indicated that her evidence was preferable to that of the alleged father and 
his witnesses. He held that the matter was “basically one of credibility” and that the 
Court must be satisfied from the evidence on a balance of probabilities that the 
respondent is the child’s father, due weight being given to the gravity of the 
applicant’s allegation of paternity against the respondent.30 Furthermore, a “sneaking 
suspicion” does not displace proof on a balance of probabilities.31 
 
The most conclusive evidence of paternity is the result of a parentage test. Section 54 
of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 provides that where the parentage of a child is an 
issue, the Court may recommend that parentage tests be carried out on the child and 
any person who may be the natural parent of the child.
32
 The result of the test can be 
used to support or rebut a statutory presumption of parenthood, or as evidence in 
proceedings regarding an ex-nuptial child in which the statutory presumption of 
parenthood does not apply. While the Court can recommend a parentage test, it should 
be noted that the Court cannot order a parentage test. However, if a party refuses to 
consent to the test the Court may draw any inferences it thinks proper, subject to the 
right of the refusing party to explain his or her reasons.
33
 Where the Court concludes 
the results of a parentage test are vital to determine the parentage of the child, the 
Court may place the child under the guardianship of the Court
34
 and provide the 
required consent to enable the child to undergo a parentage test.
35
 Courts have 
expressed frustration regarding the inability to order parentage tests and the Law 
Commission has recommended that s 54 be amended to allow Courts to order 
parentage tests,
36
 but no such amendment has yet been made.  
C Establishing fathers as legal parents of children born as a result of specified 
AHR procedures 
The provisions in Part 2 of the Status of Children Act 1969 determine who are the 
legal parents of children born as a result of specified AHR procedures involving the 
use of donated gametes.
37
 Collectively, the provisions provide that legal parenthood is 
based on the psychological commitment of the social parents rather than on a 
                                                 
29
 Hall v Vail [1972] NZLR 95. 
30
 Ibid, at 96. 
31
 See for example Cook v Gibbons (1986) 3 FRNZ 257.  
32
 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 54(1).  
33
 Section 57(2). 
34
 Care of Children Act 2004, s 31. 
35
 T v S [Guardianship] [2005] NZFLR 466 (CA). 
36
 Law Commission New Issues in Legal Parenthood (NZLC R88, 2005) at [5.76].  
37
 Part 2 was inserted by the Status of Children Amendment Act 2004 which repealed the Status of 
Children Amendment Act 1987. 
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biological blood line.
38
 Therefore, a child’s legal father in this context is usually not 
the child’s biological father.  
 
Where donated sperm is used either by itself or in an embryo, and the mother has 
undergone the procedure with her partner’s consent, the mother’s partner is for all 
purposes the legal parent of any child of the pregnancy.
39
 Consent is presumed, 
although any question of fact that arises will be determined on a balance of 
probabilities.
40
 Non-partner donors are excluded from legal parenthood, unless 
subsequent to the time of conception they become the mother’s partner.41 
Furthermore, the presumptions of paternity in Part 2 override any conflicting evidence 
of paternity that could arise by virtue of Part 1, including a declaration of paternity or 
a paternity order.
42
   
 
Finally, Part 2 of the Act is also subject to Part 3 of the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act 2004 which provides detailed provisions in regards to the collection 
and storage of identifying information of donors and their offspring. The provisions 
aim to ensure that donor offspring are able to access information about their genetic 
origins.
43
 Accordingly, when the child reaches 18 years of age, information about the 
donor (who is their biological parent) must be provided to him or her upon request.
44
 
                                                 
38
 Henaghan et al Family Law in New Zealand (13
th
 ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) vol 2 at [10.2]. 
39
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 18. 
40
 Section 27.  
41
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 22.  
42
 Section 26.  
43
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 4(e). 
44
 Section 50. 
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III Guiding principles in paternity proceedings 
 
The following New Zealand legal principles relate to various aspects of paternity and 
are drawn from the Status of Children Act 1969, the Family Proceedings Act 1980, 
the Care of Children Act 2004, the Child Support Act 1991, and the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004. The principles are either well established and 
authoritative, or relatively new. Some can be applied concurrently while others 
conflict. These principles, and their relative importance, will be used in each of the 
following three chapters to explain outcomes under the current legal framework and 
to provide a basis for the main arguments put forward and recommendations made.  
 
The two core principles of this dissertation are principles A and B as these are the two 
core principles of legal parenthood. Principles C to F are subsidiary principles that 
supplement principles A and B.  
A Legal parenthood is based on a biological relationship between the parent and 
the child
45
 
It is well established in law that a child’s biological mother is the child’s legal mother. 
Although there is no explicit statutory definition of a legal father, the combined effect 
of relevant legislation is that the legal father of a child is his or her biological father.
46
  
B The legal parenthood of children born as a result of specified AHR procedures 
is based on the psychological commitment of the intended social parents
47
 
An exception to the legal connection between biology and parenthood has been 
created because of new assisted reproductive technologies. The provisions in Part 2 of 
the Status of Children Act 1969 essentially provide for parenthood to be based on the 
psychological commitment of the intended social parents rather than on a biological 
blood line.
48
 
C There should be certainty about the legal status of children in relation to their 
parents   
The certainty of a child’s status in relation to their mother is rarely an issue. However, 
the status of a child in relation to their father can be uncertain depending on the 
circumstances of the child’s conception. Section 8 of the Status of Children Act 1969 
provides a list of instruments that prove paternity and determine the status of children 
                                                 
45
 Bar adoption, which is a notable exception this principle. 
46
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 7, s 8, and s 10; Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 2 as amended by 
schedule 3 of the Care of Children Act 2004. 
47
 Bar surrogacy, which is a notable exception this principle. 
48
 Henaghan et al Family Law in New Zealand (13
th
 ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) vol 2 at [10.2]. 
 
10 Chapter 3 Guiding principles in paternity proceedings 
 
in relation to their fathers, thus providing certainty in terms of their status. A 
declaration of paternity provides the most certainty in terms of the child’s status as it 
is a judgment in rem. A paternity order, a signed copy of the child’s birth certificate 
and various other mechanisms provide prima facie evidence of paternity and certainty 
about the child’s status in the absence of any other conflicting evidence.  
 
The provisions in Part 2 of the Status of Children Act 1969 were inserted to remove 
the previous uncertainty about the status of children born as a result of AHR 
procedures. Section 13(1) specifically provides that one of the main purposes of the 
Act is to remove uncertainty about the status of children conceived as a result of AHR 
procedures.  
 
It should be noted that the Act only provides for the certainty of a child’s status at a 
certain point in time. It does not provide that there should be certainty in terms of the 
child’s status over their lifetime, in other words that the child’s status is fixed. The 
status of a child can change over time for various reasons. For example, adoption 
changes the legal status of a child in relation to their biological parents.
49
 In cases of 
misattributed paternity, the child’s legal status in relation to their legal father can 
change if it is proven he is not the child’s biological father.50 Finally, a child born as 
the result of an AHR procedure may ‘acquire’ a legal parent if the donor subsequently 
becomes the partner of the child’s mother.51  
D Error, lack of consent and deceit can affect legal parenthood in some 
circumstances 
As previously noted, principles A and B are the core principles of legal parenthood. 
However, there are three subsidiary principles (D(i)-(iii)) that can provide full or 
partial exceptions to principles A or B. These conflicting principles concern three 
factors: lack of consent, error, and deceit.  
 
There is only one principle in the Status of Children Act 1969 which recognizes that 
consent (or lack of) affects legal parenthood, namely: 
(i) When a partnered woman becomes pregnant as the result of an AHR 
procedure using the semen of a man who is not her partner, he will only 
become the legal parent of the child if he consented to the AHR procedure 
This principle can be found in s 18 of the Status of Children Act 1969 which provides 
that: 
                                                 
49
 Adoption Act 1955, s 16. 
50
 Status of Children Act, s 10(3). 
51
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 24. 
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 18 When woman's non-donor partner is parent, and non-partner semen donor 
 or ovum donor is not parent 
 (1) This section applies to the following situation: 
  (a) a partnered woman (woman A) becomes pregnant as a result of an AHR 
  procedure: 
  (b) the semen (or part of the semen) used for the procedure was produced by 
  a man who is not woman A's partner or, as the case requires, the ovum or 
  embryo used for the procedure was produced by, or derived from an ovum 
  produced by a woman who is not woman A's partner: 
  (c) woman A has undergone the procedure with her partner's consent.  
 (2) In that situation, woman A's partner is, for all purposes, a parent of any child of 
 the pregnancy. 
Section 18 is subject to s 22 which provides that the consent of the woman’s partner is 
presumed. However, if he can rebut the presumption by pointing to evidence that he 
did not consent to the AHR procedure then he does not become the child’s legal 
parent. Instead, the woman who has undergone the AHR procedure is deemed to be a 
‘woman acting alone’ and is the sole legal parent of the child.52 
 
Similarly, there is only one principle in the Status of Children Act 1969 which 
recognises that error or deceit affects legal parenthood, namely: 
(D)(ii) Proof of an error (resulting from deceit or mistake) regarding the 
existence of a biological relationship between the legal parent and the child 
will end the legal relationship of parent and child 
This principle is encapsulated in s 10(3) of the Act which provides that a Court may 
make a declaration of non-paternity (whether the alleged father or the alleged child or 
both of them are living or dead) if it is proved to the Court's satisfaction that the 
relationship does not exist. 
 
The final principle provides a partial exception to principle A as it does not provide an 
exception to legal parenthood but rather an exception to one of the most important 
aspects of legal parenthood, namely child support:  
 (iii) The circumstances of a child’s conception can determine whether the 
 child’s  biological parent is liable to pay child support  
This principle is encapsulated in s 89Z of the Child Support Act 1990 which provides 
that the Commissioner of Inland Revenue must exempt a biological parent from 
paying child support if that person was the victim of a sex offence which resulted in 
the conception of the qualifying child. This provision provides the only full exemption 
to child support liability.  
                                                 
52
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 14. 
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E Males and females must provide consent to the use of their gametes in order for 
them to be used in an AHR procedure 
The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 provides a legislative 
framework for controls on assisted reproductive technology. The Act provides that all 
persons exercising powers or performing functions under the Act must be guided by 
the seven principles of the Act. One such principle is that no AHR procedure should 
be performed on an individual unless the individual has made an informed choice and 
given informed consent.
53
 AHR procedure is defined in s 5 of the Act as a procedure 
performed for the purpose of assisting human reproduction that involves: 
(a) the creation of an in vitro human embryo; or 
(b) the storage, manipulation, or use of an in vitro human gamete or an in vitro 
human embryo; or 
(c) the use of cells derived from an in vitro human embryo; or 
(d) the implantation into a human being of human gametes or human embryos; but 
does not include an established procedure. 
 
It is important to note that the exclusion of established procedures from the definition 
of an AHR procedure creates a loophole in that on a strict interpretation of the Act  
s 4(d) does not apply to established procedures. In other words it is not a requirement 
that an individual give informed consent before an established procedure is performed 
on them. The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Order 2005 provides a list of 
established procedures which includes two common procedures: artificial 
insemination and in vitro fertilisation (IVF). However, presumably it was not the 
intent of Parliament to require informed consent for AHR procedures and not 
established procedures, and regardless, the loophole is arguably closed by the Health 
and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumer’s 
Rights) Regulations 1996. Right 7 provides that consumers of health and disability 
services have the right to make an informed choice, give informed consent, and 
withdraw consent.
54
 Section 10(a) of Right 7 specifically provides that no body part or 
bodily substance removed or obtained in the course of a health care procedure may be 
stored, preserved, or used otherwise than with the informed consent of the consumer. 
Body part or bodily substances would logically include male and female gametes. 
 
Furthermore, the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 provides that 
the Governor-General may, by Order of Council, make regulations that prescribe 
requirements for informed consent for the collection of gametes and embryos in 
connection with the performance of AHR procedures or any other lawful use of the 
                                                 
53
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 4(d). 
54
 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumer’s Rights) 
Regulations 1996, Right 7. 
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gametes or embryos.
55
 No such requirements have yet been made but if and when they 
are made, it is a statutory requirement that they cannot be inconsistent with the Code 
of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights. Therefore the combined effect 
of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 and the Code of Health 
and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights is that men and women must give 
informed consent to the use of their gametes in order for them to be used in an AHR 
procedure or an established procedure. 
F Children should be able to access information about their genetic origins 
A clear principle of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 is that 
children conceived as the result of an AHR procedure involving one or more donors 
should be made aware of their genetic origins and be able to access information 
about their origins.56 Part 3 of the Act contains detailed provisions about the 
collection, storage and access to information concerning donors and children 
conceived using donated sperm, eggs or embryos. Significantly, on reaching 18 years 
of age, the child must be provided with information about the relevant donor upon 
their request.
57
 
 
Naturally conceived children do not have the same guaranteed access to information 
about their genetic origins. While it will usually be clear who the child’s biological 
mother is, it may be less clear who the child’s biological father is as the child’s birth 
certificate may not record the name of the child’s father, or the named father may in 
fact not be the child’s biological father. In civil proceedings where the parentage of a 
child is an issue the Court may recommend a parentage test be carried out to obtain or 
clarify information on the child’s genetic origins, although the Court does not have 
the statutory authority to order a parentage test.
58
 However, if the Court concludes the 
results of a parentage test are vital to determine the parentage of the child, the Court 
may place the child under the guardianship of the Court
59
 and provide the required 
consent to enable the child to undergo a parentage test.60  
G Welfare and best interests of the child 
Finally, it is important to note that one of the paramount principles of family law is 
not a relevant principle in terms of determining legal parenthood and will therefore 
not be used in this dissertation. Section 4 of the Care of Children Act 2004 provides 
                                                 
55
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 76(1A).  
56
 Section 4(e). 
57
 Section 50. 
58
 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 54. 
59
 Care of Children Act 2004, s 31. 
60
 See T v S [Guardianship] [2005] NZFLR 466 (CA) and more recently Fletcher v Blackburn 
[Guardianship] [2009] NZFLR 354 (HC). 
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that the child’s welfare and best interests must be the first and paramount 
consideration in the administration and application of the Act and in any other 
proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-day care 
for, or contact with, a child. 
 
Legal parenthood is determined by the Status of Children Act 1969 and proceedings 
concerning legal parenthood do not involve any of the matters described in s 4. 
Therefore it is not applied in proceedings regarding legal parenthood. Exclusion of the 
consideration of the welfare and best interests of the child has been confirmed by the 
Family Court, although the Court has noted that some regard should be had to the 
child’s welfare pursuant to the articles contained in the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UNCROC).
61
 Where possible this dissertation will consider 
the articles, although it must be noted they are not strictly part of New Zealand 
domestic law but rather part of New Zealand’s international obligations. Therefore, 
they are a secondary consideration to the principles and provisions in New Zealand 
legislation. 
 
While the welfare and best interests of the child principle is not relevant in regards to 
determining legal parenthood, it can be relevant in regards to proving parentage. The 
Court will have regard to ss 4 and 5 of the Care of Children Act 2004 when deciding 
whether to place a child under the guardianship of the Court for the purpose of the 
Court granting consent to a parentage test.
62
 
 
                                                 
61
 See for example L v R FC Nelson FAM-2005-042-489, 21 September 2007 at [36].
 
62
 See T v S [Guardianship] [2005] NZFLR 466 (CA) and more recently Fletcher v Blackburn 
[Guardianship] [2009] NZFLR 354 (HC). 
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IV Non-consensual artificial paternity   
A Introduction 
Advances in assisted reproductive technology have provided new ways for women 
and men to use their own genetic material, as well as that of donors, to conceive 
children. This section analyses non-consensual artificial paternity that can arise from 
the misuse of such technology to conceive a child. More specifically, non-consensual 
artificial paternity results from the use of a male’s semen (or embryos created using 
his semen) by a female in an AHR procedure without his consent to conceive a child. 
The AHR procedure could include an artificial insemination procedure using the 
male’s semen, or the implantation of embryos created using the male’s semen.  
 
This type of paternity can occur when a couple agree to store semen samples or 
embryos for future use but then separate, and after the separation the female party 
goes ahead with an AHR procedure using the samples without the knowledge of her 
former partner and conceives a child. Alternatively, the couple may have begun 
fertility treatment using the samples and separate in the course of treatment, and after 
the separation the female party continues treatment without the knowledge of her 
former partner and conceives a child. 
 
These types of scenarios are complex as the samples may provide the female party 
with her only chance of having a genetically related child if they were stored before 
she underwent medical treatment which resulted in infertility, or if she has reached an 
age where her fertility levels are so low that she cannot conceive a child naturally. In 
contrast, the male party may no longer want to become a parent or he may want to 
become a parent but not with a former partner.  
 
While scenarios involving non-consensual artificial paternity are currently rare, they 
may increase as more couples decide to store samples for medical reasons and 
undergo treatment later in life when their fertility levels are low, and earlier on in 
relationships when they are perhaps more unstable. In addition, without rigid 
requirements to ensure the consent of both parties is still valid at the time of 
implantation, it may be relatively easy for the female party to deceive a fertility 
treatment provider and use stored samples without the knowledge or consent of her 
former partner. This could be done, for example, by failing to inform the provider that 
she and her partner have separated, or by forging her former partner’s signature on the 
necessary consent forms.  
 
The main issue analysed in this chapter is the effect of the biological father’s lack of 
consent to the use of his semen (or embryos created using his semen) on his status as a 
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legal father. In other words, is a male who did not consent to an AHR procedure 
involving the use of his semen (or embryos created using his semen) the legal father 
of the resulting child? 
 
This issue has not yet arisen in New Zealand
63
 although in England two female 
plaintiffs have previously sought a court order to allow them to use embryos created 
with the semen of their former partners without their consent.
64
 The landmark 
judgment was appealed the Court of Appeal
65
 and then to the European Court of 
Human Rights.
66
 In England there have also been media reports of a female who 
tricked a fertility clinic into allowing her to use the semen of her former partner to 
conceive two children.
67
 A number of cases have also arisen in the United States 
which explore the use of embryos post separation and the right to become, or not to 
become, a parent.
68
 These examples raise important questions concerning the right to 
reproductive autonomy for both men and women. New Zealand is in a position to 
learn from developments in other countries and consider the various issues before a 
test case comes before the Family Court in New Zealand.  
B Under the current New Zealand legal framework, is a male who did not consent 
to an AHR procedure involving the use of his semen (or embryos created using 
his semen) the legal father of the resulting child? 
 
To put this question into context, consider the following hypothetical scenario: 
 
Michelle and Ryan, a busy professional couple, marry at the age of 40. After learning 
they may have problems conceiving a child in future due to age and health concerns, 
they decide to undergo fertility treatment that involves the creation of embryos (using 
Michelle’s eggs and Ryan’s semen) and storage of the embryos for potential use in 
future. Three years later the relationship breaks down and the couple separate. A year 
after the separation Michelle decides to use the embryos to conceive a child as they 
now provide her with her last chance of having a child which she desperately wants. 
Ryan has since found a new partner and has relocated to Australia. Without informing 
Ryan of her intention to use the embryos or the fertility clinic of her separation from 
                                                 
63
 At present there is no data available in New Zealand or internationally on the number of children 
conceived in this type of scenario. 
64
 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam). 
65
 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 727. 
66
 Evans v United Kingdom [2006] 1 FCR 585 (ECHR). 
67
 See for example “Husband discovered he was a father of two after estranged wife forged his 
signature in IVF deception” (3 March, 2008) London Evening Standard <www.standard.co.uk> 
68
 Davis v Davis 842 SW 2d 588 (Tenn 1992); Kass v Kass 91 NY 2d 554 (1998); AZ v BZ 431 Mass 
150 (2000); Litowitz v Litowitz 10 P 3d 1086 (Wash Ct App 2000); JB v MB 783 A 2d 707 (NJ 2001).  
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Ryan, Michelle undergoes an embryo implantation procedure and conceives a child. 
She gives birth nine months later. 
 
Section 5 in Part 1 of the Status of Children Act 1969 and ss 18, 14 and 22 in Part 2 of 
the Act are the most appropriate provisions to determine whether Ryan is the legal 
father of the child. As there is no reported case law in New Zealand on this issue only 
legislative provisions shall be used. The relevant provisions are listed below: 
 5 Presumptions as to parenthood 
 (1) A child born to a woman during her marriage, or within 10 months after the 
  marriage has been dissolved by death or otherwise, shall, in the absence of 
  evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be the child of its mother and her 
  husband, or former husband, as the case  may be. 
 (2) Every question of fact that arises in applying subsection (1) shall be decided 
  on a balance of probabilities. 
 (3) This section shall apply in respect of every child, whether born before or after 
  the commencement of this Act, and whether born in New Zealand or not, and 
  whether or not  his father or mother has ever been domiciled in New  
  Zealand. 
 
 18 When woman's non-donor partner is parent, and non-partner semen donor 
 or ovum donor is not parent 
 (1)  This section applies to the following situation:     
  (a) a partnered woman (woman A) becomes pregnant as a result of an  
  AHR procedure: 
  (b) the semen (or part of the semen) used for the procedure was produced 
  by a man who is not woman A's partner or, as the case requires, the ovum 
  or embryo used for the procedure was produced by, or derived from an  
  ovum produced by a woman who is not woman A's partner: 
  (c) woman A has undergone the procedure with her partner's consent. 
 (2)  In that situation, woman A's partner is, for all purposes, a parent of any child 
  of the pregnancy. 
 
Section 18 must be read in accordance with the definition of ‘partnered woman’ in s 
14 which provides that: 
 partnered woman means a woman who— 
 (a) is married or in a civil union; or 
 (b) is married or in a civil union, but is living with a man, or with another woman, as 
 a de facto partner; or 
 (c) is not married or in a civil union but is living with a man, or with another woman, 
 as a de facto partner 
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Finally s 22 provides that: 
 22 Woman acting alone: non-partner semen donor not parent unless later 
 becomes mother's partner 
 (1) This section applies to the following situation: 
  (a) a woman acting alone becomes pregnant as a result of an AHR  
  procedure: 
  (b) the semen used for the procedure was produced by a man (man A) who 
  is not her partner. 
 (2)  In that situation, man A is not, for any purpose, a parent of any child of the 
  pregnancy unless man A becomes, after the time of conception, the woman's 
  partner  (in which case the rights and liabilities of man A, and of any child of 
  the pregnancy, are determined in accordance with section 24). 
 
As the child was conceived as a result of an AHR procedure the logical starting point 
is s 18.
69
 In accordance with s 18(1) the first question to consider is whether Michelle 
is a ‘partnered woman.’ The definition of partnered woman includes a woman who is 
married. As Ryan and Michelle are separated but still legally married, Michelle does 
fall within the definition of a partnered woman. Section 18(2) provides that the semen 
used for the procedure was produced by a man who is not the woman’s partner. As 
Ryan is Michelle’s partner for the purposes of s 18, the section does not apply. 
Therefore, s 5 becomes the most appropriate provision to determine whether Ryan is 
the legal father of the child. As Ryan and Michelle were legally married at the time of 
the procedure, the statutory presumption of parenthood will apply to Ryan. 
Furthermore, he will not be able to rebut the presumption as he is the child’s 
biological father. 
 
Now suppose Michelle and Ryan were previously living together in a de facto 
relationship before they separated and Michelle underwent the procedure. In this 
scenario Michelle is a not a ‘partnered woman’ as she was not living in a de facto 
relationship with Ryan at the time she underwent the AHR procedure, therefore s 18 
does not apply.
70
 In addition the statutory presumption of parenthood in s 5 does not 
apply to Ryan, as the section only includes married partners (who may be separated 
but are still legally married or in a civil union). Instead, s 22 would apply in this 
scenario and the outcome of the application of the section would be that Ryan is not 
the legal father of the child. This is because ‘woman acting alone’ includes Michelle 
                                                 
69
 The type of procedure Michelle has undergone does not involve a donor so it does not strictly fall 
within the definition of an AHR procedure in s 15. However, for the purposes of this dissertation an 
extended definition is used by virtue of s 14(1) on the interpretation of the Act which provides that an 
AHR procedure is that defined in s 15 ‘unless the context otherwise requires’.  
70
 Although depending on the specific facts regarding the relationship Michelle could argue that she is 
still in a de facto relationship using the definition of de facto partner provided in section 29A of the 
Interpretation Act 1999. 
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as a non-partnered woman,
71
 and the semen used in the procedure was produced by a 
man who was not her partner, namely Ryan.
72
 The outcome of the application of s 22, 
and the inability to apply ss 18 or 5 to this particular fact pattern is that the child has 
no legal father and therefore only one legal parent, namely Michelle. The only way 
the child could possibly have a legal father is if Ryan re-partnered with Michelle. 
However, considering the circumstances this is very unlikely. 
 
Finally, suppose Michelle had re-partnered with a different man named Tim and was 
either married to him, in a civil union, or living with him as a de facto partner when 
she underwent the procedure. Applying s 18, Michelle is a partnered woman because 
of her relationship with Tim. The semen used for the procedure was produced by a 
man who is not her partner, namely Ryan. Finally, Tim’s consent to the procedure is 
required which is presumed in absence of evidence to the contrary.
73
 If Tim did 
consent he will become the child’s legal father. Even in the scenario where Ryan and 
Michelle are still legally married but Michelle is in a de facto relationship with Tim, 
Michelle’s new de facto partnership with Tim will result in Tim ‘trumping’ Ryan as a 
the child’s legal parent, as s 26 provides that s 18 has effect despite any conflicting 
evidence of paternity. If for some reason Tim did not consent and can prove on the 
balance of probabilities he did not consent,
74
 he will not become the child’s father. 
The child will therefore have no legal father and only one legal parent, namely 
Michelle.  
 
The overall application of the current legal framework to the scenario involving Ryan 
and Michelle, and other variations of the scenario, demonstrate that unusual and 
inconsistent outcomes can result. There is clearly a lack of certainty about the status 
of the children in relation to their biological fathers in these types of scenarios as the 
creation of the legal relationship is dependent on a variable factor, namely whether or 
not the child’s mother has re-partnered at the time she underwent the AHR procedure.  
C The main principles supporting the current legal framework  
The current legal framework on legal parenthood is made up of provisions from Part 1 
and Part 2 of the Status of Children Act 1969. The two parts of the Act are distinct 
and are not designed to be applied concurrently
75
 as they are based on conflicting 
principles A and B:   
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 Status of Children Act 1969, s 14(1).  
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 Section 22. 
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 Section 27(1). 
74
 Section 27(2). 
75
 Section 26. 
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(A) Legal parenthood is based on a biological relationship between the parent and 
 the child 
(B) The legal parenthood of children born as a result of specified AHR procedures 
 involving donors is based on the psychological commitment of the intended 
 social parents rather than on a biological relationship 
 
While s 13 specifies that one of the main purposes of Part 2 is to remove uncertainty 
about the status of children conceived as a result of AHR procedures, application of 
the current legal framework results in unusual and uncertain outcomes in this 
particular context. Therefore, the current legal framework does not uphold principle C 
which provides that: 
(C) There should be certainty about the legal status of children in relation to their 
 parents 
 
Furthermore, while the current legal framework does not take into account the 
biological father’s lack of consent to the AHR procedure, it does recognise that if the 
biological mother has a new partner when she undergoes the procedure, he will 
become the child’s legal parent if he consents to the procedure. This outcome is in 
accordance with principle D(i) which provides that: 
(D)(i) When a partnered woman becomes pregnant as the result of an AHR         
 procedure using the semen of a man who is not her partner, her partner will      
 only become the legal parent of the child if he consented to the AHR 
 procedure 
 
Finally, the current legal framework does not uphold principle E which provides that: 
(E) Men and women must provide consent to the use of their gametes in order for 
them to be used in an AHR procedure 
This is evident in the fact that the biological father’s lack of consent to the AHR 
procedure is currently not a relevant factor to determine whether he should be the 
child’s legal father.  
D Dissertation argument  
Determining the legal parenthood of a male and a female who have undergone an 
AHR procedure using their own gametes will usually be a straightforward non-
contentious matter. This is because both parties are likely to be married, in a civil 
union or in a de facto relationship with each other and both are likely to have 
consented to the AHR procedure and intend to become legal parents. In such cases, 
the provisions in Part 1 of the Status of Children Act are suitable to determine legal 
parenthood.  
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However, the circumstances surrounding such an AHR procedure will not always be 
straightforward, as demonstrated by the hypothetical scenario involving Ryan and 
Michelle. This is because fertility treatment can be a protracted and stressful process 
which results in the breakdown of relationships, and one party (most likely the female 
party) may wish to continue with treatment to conceive a child while the male party 
does not. The female party may particularly want to proceed with the AHR procedure 
if the stored semen samples or embryos provide her last change of conceiving a child. 
Such complex scenarios may occur more frequently as increasing numbers of couples 
undergo fertility treatment, particularly at an older age when their fertility rate is low, 
and in the earlier stages of a relationship when the relationship is more unstable.  
 
This dissertation argues that the current legal framework on legal parenthood made up 
from provisions from Part 1 and Part 2 of the Status of Children Act 1969 are not 
designed to determine the legal parenthood of a biological father who did not consent 
to the AHR procedure which resulted in the conception of a child. The provisions in 
Part 1 do not allow for consideration of the biological father’s lack of consent to the 
AHR procedure which is a key factor, and the provisions in Part 2 are designed 
specifically for AHR procedures involving a donor
76
 not AHR procedures involving 
two people who are using their own gametes. Therefore, a specific provision needs to 
be formulated and inserted into the Act to determine the legal parenthood of a 
biological father who did not consent to the AHR procedure which resulted in the 
conception of a child.  
 
In the following analysis, the relevant principles that could be used to formulate this 
provision are identified and analysed. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are 
then used to provide the basis for the provision which is designed to be directly 
inserted into Part 2 of the Act.   
 
(i) Which of the two core principles of legal parenthood should form the basis 
of the proposed provision? 
 
Principle A and principle B are the two core principles of legal parenthood. Both of 
these conflicting principles are present in the current legal framework used to 
determine the legal parenthood of a biological father who did not consent to the AHR 
procedure which resulted in the conception of a child. Because this results in 
uncertainty in outcomes, only one of the principles should be used to form the basis of 
the proposed provision. 
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Principle B emphasises that the legal parents of a child born as a result of an AHR 
procedure should be those who will be the child’s social parents and have a 
psychological commitment to the child. This principle is the basis for the provisions 
in Part 2 of the Status of Children Act 1969 which provide that a donor does not 
become the child’s legal parent because even though there is a biological relationship 
between the donor and the child, the donor is not going to be the child’s social parent 
and has no psychological commitment towards the child. However, a donor becomes 
the child’s legal parent if he subsequently partners with the child’s biological mother 
after she has undergone the AHR using his semen. This is because the law recognises 
that by virtue of the relationship with the child’s mother the donor intends to be the 
child’s social parent and has a psychological commitment to the child. Similarly, non-
donor partners of women who undergo AHR procedures involving a donor’s semen 
are assumed to be the child’s social parent and to have a psychological commitment to 
the child by virtue of their relationship with the child’s biological mother. 
 
The proposed provision should be based on principle B because in the current context 
the biological father could be regarded as in a similar position to a donor. He has a 
biological relationship with the child but at the time the mother underwent the AHR 
procedure he did not intend to be the child’s social parent and had no psychological 
commitment to child. This is demonstrated by the fact that he was not in a relationship 
with the child’s mother nor did he consent to the use of his semen or embryos created 
using his semen in the AHR procedure. In some cases he may be completely unaware 
that the child’s mother underwent the AHR procedure.  
 
Principle A should not be used to formulate the provision because it is too rigid for 
the current context. It does not take into account the complexities arising from AHR 
procedures where one gamete provider has provided consent and the other has not.   
 
(ii) Which subsidiary principles should be used to formulate the provision?  
 
It is argued that subsidiary principle C, D(i), E and G should be used to formulate the 
provision. Firstly, the provision should remove the current uncertainty surrounding 
the child’s legal status in relation to their biological father (principle C). 
 
Secondly, principle D(i) provides that a non-donor partner of a woman undergoing an 
AHR procedure using the semen of another man must consent to the procedure in 
order for him to become the child’s legal parent. It is the only provision in the Act 
which recognises that lack of consent to an AHR procedure is a relevant factor in 
terms of legal parenthood. In practical terms, the effect of the provision is that if the 
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non-donor partner consents to the procedure he becomes the child’s legal parent, but 
if he does not consent to the procedure he does not become the child’s legal parent. 
 
Principle D(i) should be extended to include all men whose gametes are used by 
women who have undergone an AHR procedure resulting in the conception of a child, 
whether they are the woman’s partner or not (although donors must be excluded).77 In 
other words, if a male consents to an AHR procedure involving the use of his gametes 
he becomes the child’s legal parent. Alternatively, if he does not consent to the 
procedure he does not becomes the child’s legal parent. 
 
The extension of principle D(i) can be justified by principle E, which is a strong 
principle in the legal framework on AHR procedures. Principle E provides that men 
and women must consent to the use of their gametes in AHR procedures and more 
specifically, previously given consent can be withdrawn. The legal framework on 
AHR procedures and the legal framework on legal parenthood are inextricably linked 
because AHR procedures inevitably result in the conception of children and thus, 
legal parenthood. Therefore there should be continuity and consistency between the 
two legal frameworks. The current lack of continuity and consistency results in a 
major anomaly, namely, a person’s consent is required in order for their gametes to be 
used in an AHR procedure, but if they are used without the person’s consent, that 
person is still the child’s legal parent.  
 
It is logical and straightforward that men must consent to the use of their semen in an 
AHR procedure in order to become a child’s legal parent. However, issues arise in 
scenarios where the AHR procedure involves the use of an embryo which contains the 
gametes of two people. As in the hypothetical scenario involving Ryan and Michelle, 
one party may consent to the use of the embryo while the other does not. It appears 
that Parliament contemplated such a scenario arising as s 76 of the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004 provides that the Governor-General may make 
regulations on the use or destruction of in vitro gametes or in vitro embryos, in 
particular, without limitation, in cases where one party from whom such a gamete or 
embryo has been obtained or formed withdraws his or her consent to any course of 
action.
78
 However, no such regulations have been made thus far. Due to the absence 
of New Zealand regulations or case law on this matter, it is necessary to consider 
developments in other common law jurisdictions for guidance. 
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 The inclusion of donors would result in major inconsistencies with the current provisions regarding 
donors in the Status of Children Act 1969.  
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 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 76(1)(a)(ii).  
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England was one of the first countries in the world to enact legislation regulating 
AHR procedures. The Human Fertilisation Embryology Act 1990 arguably contains 
the most comprehensive consent requirements in regards to embryo use.
79
 Section 
6(3) of Schedule 3 provides that an embryo must not be used for any purpose unless 
there is an effective consent by each person whose gametes were used to bring about 
the creation of the embryo. Effective consent is consent which has not been 
withdrawn in writing.
80
 
 
The statutory requirement that both gamete providers must consent to the use of the 
embryo was subsequently challenged in the landmark case of Evans v Amicus 
Healthcare Ltd.
81
 It is the only reported case to arise in the common law jurisdiction 
concerning a female who sought to use embryos created using her gametes and that of 
her former partner without his consent. The plaintiff, Ms Evans, was diagnosed with 
cancer and was advised that the medical treatment she required could affect her 
fertility. She and her de facto partner underwent fertility treatment together which 
involved the creation and storage of embryos. Both parties signed forms consenting to 
the creation and storage of the embryos. Several years later the parties separated and 
Ms Evans’ former partner contacted the fertility clinic, withdrew his consent to the 
continued storage of the embryos, and requested that they be destroyed. Ms Evans 
sought a declaration that her former partner had not, and could not, vary or withdraw 
his consent to the implantation of the embryos. She argued that the implantation of the 
embryos was part of the course of treatment she and her former partner had previously 
consented to, therefore they were still being treated together and his withdrawal of 
consent was ineffective.  
 
The case turned on the interpretation of “treatment together” in s 28(3) of the Act in 
relation to the consent requirements contained in Schedule 3 of the Act, in particular s 
26(3). If Ms Evans and her former partner were regarded as still receiving “treatment 
together” then the consent previously given by her former partner would still be valid. 
In a lengthy judgment the Court of Appeal dismissed her claim, stating:
82
 
 The point, however, remains whether or not the consent is still effective. This is 
 essentially an issue of fact. The facts here are that both couples have separated, and 
 no longer have any form of relationship with each other. In these circumstances, in 
 my judgment, it cannot be said, as a matter of fact, that either couple in this case is 
 still being treated together. 
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 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
80
 Schedule 3, para 1(3). 
81
 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam). In the first instance, there were two 
plaintiffs (Ms Evans and Ms Hadley) who brought identical claims. However, Ms Evans was the sole 
appellant.   
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 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 727 at [147]. 
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The Court emphasised that:
83
 
 The need for the clinic to have an effective, continuing consent of both gamete 
 providers pursuant to paragraph 6(3) of Schedule 3 at all times up to the  transfer of 
  the embryo into the woman is critical. 
 
Accordingly, Ms Evans was prohibited from using the embryos. While leave to appeal 
to the House of Lords was refused, Ms Evans was granted leave to appeal to the 
European Court of Human Rights.
84
 She based her claim on breaches of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to privacy and family life, which were 
unsuccessfully pleaded in the first instance and in the Court of Appeal. However, her 
appeal was unsuccessful. The Court refused to enter into a balancing exercise of the 
rights of the parties, instead relying on the exceptionally clear-cut legislation.
85
 The 
Court endorsed the overall conclusion of the Court of Appeal that one party cannot 
force biological (and thus legal parenthood) onto the other, regardless of the gender of 
the party who wishes to become a parent. On this point the European Court of Human 
Rights cited the comments of Wall J, made in the first instance, with approval:
86
 
 It is not difficult to reverse the dilemma. If a man has testicular cancer and his sperm, 
 preserved prior to radical surgery which renders him permanently infertile, is used to 
 create embryos  with his partner; and if the couple have separated before the embryos 
 are transferred into the woman, nobody would suggest that she could not withdraw 
 her consent to treatment and refuse to have the embryos transferred into her. 
 
While Ms Evans was ultimately unsuccessful in arguing that she should be able to use 
the embryos without her former partner’s consent, her case prompted Parliament to 
amend the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 to provide for a 12 month 
‘cooling off period’ after consent by one party has been withdrawn. If both parties still 
do not consent to the use of the embryos after 12 months, they will then be 
destroyed.
87
 The reasoning from Evans was subsequently followed in In Re R (A 
Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child).
88
  
 
In Australia, there is no national legislation that regulates assisted reproductive 
technology. However, three states have enacted state legislation that contains similar 
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statutory consent provisions concerning embryo use.
89
 The Western Australian 
Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 provides that an embryo must not be used 
for any purpose unless there is effective consent by each person from whose gametes 
the embryo was derived.
90
 Either person can withdraw consent to the use of the 
embryo by giving notice,
91
 although consent cannot be withdrawn once the embryo 
has been used.
92
 
 
The Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 provides that a woman may 
undergo an AHR procedure but only if the woman and her partner (if she has a 
partner) consent to the procedure.
93
 Consent can be withdraw by giving written 
notice
94
 and cannot be withdraw after the procedure has taken place.
95
  
 
Finally, the New South Wales Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 provides 
that an ART provider must not provide ART treatment to a woman using a gamete 
except with the consent of the gamete provider.96 The gamete provider may revoke 
consent by giving written notice
97
 but must revoke consent before the embryo is 
implanted in the body of the woman.
98
 At present there is no existing Australian case 
law that tests any of the above provisions.  
 
In Canada the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 governs the use of embryos 
and provides consent requirements in regards to donors. It provides that no person 
shall make use of an in vitro embryo for any purpose unless the donor has given 
written consent, in accordance with the regulations, to its use for that purpose.
99
 In 
addition, s 2(d) provides that one of the overarching principles of the Act is that the 
principle of free and informed consent must be promoted and applied.  
 
Finally, a number of American judgments have explored the use of embryos post 
separation. Davis v Davis
100
 was the first to determine whether a female is able to use 
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embryos created using her former husband’s semen without his consent. On appeal 
the Tennessee Supreme Court held that she could not use the embryos as it would be 
repugnant to order either party to bear the consequences of parenthood against his or 
her wish. However, the Court did suggest that if the party seeking to use the embryos 
had no other reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood, the use of the embryos 
should be considered. Davis v Davis was followed by three similar judgments
101
 and a 
judgment concerning a male who wished to have embryos created using his ex wife’s 
eggs implanted into another woman (his new partner).
102
 While based on different 
reasoning, the clear implication from all the above judgments is that the wishes of the 
progenitor wishing to avoid procreation are likely to be respected.
103
 
 
Overall, analysis of statutory provisions from England, Australia and Canada and the 
judgment of Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd demonstrate that there is a general 
consensus in the common law jurisdiction that both people whose gametes were used 
to create the embryo must consent to its use. This is further supported to a large extent 
by the American judgments briefly discussed. In addition, there is a general consensus 
in the common law jurisdiction that at the time the embryo is used, previously given 
consent is still effective if it has not been withdrawn by giving written notice, and 
after the embryo has been used consent cannot be withdrawn. 
 
On that basis, in the scenario involving Ryan and Michelle, Ryan’s consent to the use 
of the embryo is still effective at the time the embryo was implanted into Michelle 
because he had not withdrawn his consent in writing. However, it is argued that the 
consent of a male in Ryan’s position should not still be effective simply because it has 
not been withdrawn in writing. Instead the test used to assess the consent of a non-
donor partner at the time their partner underwent an AHR procedure should be used. 
The test provides that consent is determined on a balance of probabilities.
104
 It is not a 
requirement that a non-donor partner must withdraw his consent in writing in order to 
avoid becoming the child’s legal parent. Therefore, to hold a male in Ryan’s position 
to a higher standard, by requiring that consent must be withdrawn in writing, would 
be inequitable and inconsistent with the Act. 
 
Based on these conclusions, an amended guiding principle for the proposed provision 
which encompasses principle D(i) and E is as follows: when a male’s gametes (or 
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embryos containing his gametes) are used by a female in an AHR procedure the male 
becomes the father of the child if he consented to the AHR procedure.
105
 Whether or 
not a male has consented to the use of his gametes or embryos containing his gametes 
will be determined on the balance of probabilities.  
 
Finally, in accordance with principle F, the provision should ensure that the child can 
access information about their genetic origins so that it is consistent with the Human 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004. 
E Recommendations  
Recommendation 1: Insert a specific provision into Part 2 of the Status of Children 
Act 1969 to determine the legal parenthood of a male whose semen or embryos 
containing his semen were used in an AHR procedure without his consent.  
 
The provision below has been drafted using a similar structure and language to 
existing provisions in Part 2 of the Status of Children Act 1969 for consistency. 
 
18A When non-consenting male semen provider deemed donor 
(1) This section applies to the following situation: 
 A partnered or unpartnered woman (woman A) becomes pregnant as a result 
 of an AHR procedure or an established procedure and: 
  (a) the semen (or part of the semen) used for the procedure was  
  produced by a male who did not consent to the use of his semen in the 
  procedure; or 
  (b) the embryo used for the procedure was produced by woman A’s 
  ovum and the semen of a male who did not consent to the use of the 
  embryo in the procedure. 
(2) In that situation, the male is, for all purposes, a donor and not the legal parent 
 of any resulting child of woman A’s pregnancy for the purposes of this Act; 
 and Part 3 of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004.  
(3) Every question of fact that arises in applying subsection (1) must be decided 
 on a balance of probabilities. 
 
Deeming a non-consenting male a donor instead of a legal parent reflects principle B 
because at the time of the child’s conception he was not an intended social parent with 
a psychological commitment towards the child. Therefore he should not become the 
child’s legal parent. The provision reflects principle C as it removes the current 
uncertainty in regards to the child’s legal status towards their biological father. 
Finally, it reflects principle D(i) and E because the male’s lack of consent to the AHR 
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procedure determines whether he becomes the child’s legal father. Principle F is also 
reflected in the provision as the child will be able to access information about their 
genetic origins in accordance with Part 3 of the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act 2004. 
 
It should be noted that a male who did not consent to the AHR procedure and thus the 
conception of the child may want to have a significant parenting role or simply have 
some contact with the child. In K v P,
106
 decided under the Guardianship Act 1968 
and the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987, the High Court held that a sperm 
donor could not apply for custody or access as a “father” because he had “no rights 
and liabilities as a father.” However, he could apply as “any other person.” The Court 
subsequently granted the donor’s application on the basis that it was in the child’s best 
interests.  
 
In cases of non-consensual artificial paternity, the biological father could apply for a 
parenting order under the Care of Children Act as “any other person”107 although it is 
questionable whether such an application would be successful because under the 
Status of Children Amendment Act 2004 a donor is not a father “for any purpose.” 
Therefore, to grant the order may be seen as going against parliamentary intent. 
However, if a strong argument was made that granting the order would be in the best 
interests of the child, the Court may take a different view.  
 
Recommendation 2: The Governor General should pass an order of council in 
accordance with s 76(1)(ii) of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 
2004. 
 
This order of council would contain regulations on the use or destruction of in vitro 
gametes or in vitro embryos, in particular, without limitation, in cases where one party 
from whom such a gamete or embryo has been obtained or formed withdraws his or 
her consent to any course of action. Guidance on the wording of the regulations 
should be drawn from the English Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as it 
provides the most comprehensive legislative scheme on consent requirements, 
although guidance could also be drawn from Australian legislation.  
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V Non-consensual natural paternity and deceitful natural paternity 
A Introduction  
Non-consensual natural paternity results from the unplanned conception of a child 
after consensual sexual intercourse. The conception of the child may have resulted 
from a lack of contraception, faulty contraception or miscommunication regarding 
contraception. Similarly, deceitful natural paternity results from consensual sexual 
intercourse although it is a deliberate deceitful act by the child’s mother that caused 
the conception of the child. She may have lied about her use of the contraceptive pill, 
pricked the condom, lied about infertility, or collected discarded semen (for example 
out of a used condom) and inseminated it into herself without the knowledge and 
consent of the male party. Similarly, semen could collected in the course of oral sex 
and be inseminated without the knowledge and consent of the male party. 
 
There are many different circumstances in which an unplanned child may be 
conceived, for example: after a one night stand, during a short or long term 
relationship, during a marriage, or during a separation. Instances of deceitful paternity 
can occur in similar circumstances. At present there are no reliable statistics on the 
number of unplanned children as the data is perhaps too difficult to obtain, although 
arguably a considerable number of children are unplanned. Similarly, there are no 
reliable statistics on the number of children who were conceived as a result of deceit, 
although the growing number media reports on the topic,
108
 and anecdotal evidence,
109
 
suggest instances of deceitful paternity do occur more than minimally. 
 
In scenarios involving these types of paternity there is no dispute about who the 
biological father is. The main issue is whether a biological relationship between the 
father and child should always result in a legal relationship of father and child, 
regardless of the circumstances of the conception. While this issue has not yet come 
before the New Zealand Family Court, it has been explored in a highly publicised case 
in the United States.
110
 The case highlighted several important issues regarding 
reproductive autonomy and the right to become or not to become a parent, which are 
equally relevant to males and females in New Zealand. As attitudes towards 
reproductive autonomy and parenthood change over time, the New Zealand Family 
Court may soon have to grapple with some of these issues when raised in a test case. 
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B Under the current New Zealand legal framework, is a male who did not consent 
to becoming the legal father of a child or was deceived into becoming the legal 
father of a child nevertheless the child’s legal father? 
 
To put this question into context, consider the following hypothetical scenario 
involving non-consensual natural paternity: 
 
Scenario 1: Michael and Annabel, both 19 year old university students, meet at a 
mutual friend’s party. That night they get drunk and have sexual intercourse but forget 
to use a condom.
111
 Two months later Annabel discovers she is pregnant and informs 
Michael that he is the father. Michael suggests that she have an abortion or give the 
child up for adoption as they are both still at university, not in a good financial 
position to raise a child, and barely know each other. After considering her options, 
Annabel decides to continue with the pregnancy and keeps the child.   
 
Now consider the following scenarios involving deceitful natural paternity: 
 
Scenario 2: Scott, 30, and Emma, 29, have been in a de facto relationship for two 
years. Both did not want to have children before getting married so it was agreed that 
Emma would take the contraceptive pill to avoid an unplanned pregnancy. When 
Scott is offered a job overseas Emma begins to suspect that he may break up with her 
and go alone as their relationship has become strained in recent months. Upset over 
the possibility of an impending break up she decides to deliberately stop taking the 
pill and does not tell Scott. A month later she discovers she is pregnant. When Scott 
questions how she could have become pregnant while on the pill, the two end up 
having a fight and Emma admits that she deliberately stopped taking her contraceptive 
pills in order to get pregnant so that they would stay together.  
 
Scenario 3: Jeremy, 27 and Kylie, 39 meet online through an internet dating site. 
Kylie has been unable to find ‘Mr Right’ but is adamant she wants to have a child. 
Mindful of her decreasing fertility levels and the cost of undergoing fertility treatment 
using a sperm donor, she decides to attempt to get pregnant from a one night stand. 
Jeremy is not looking for a serious relationship as he and his long term girlfriend just 
broke up, but he is keen to get back into the dating scene. After exchanging a few 
emails they meet in a bar, have a few drinks, and subsequently have sexual 
intercourse. Jeremy uses a condom. After they have finished, Jeremy removes the 
condom and falls asleep. Unbeknown to Jeremy, Kylie immediately removes the 
semen from the condom, inseminates it into herself and as a result, becomes pregnant. 
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The general statutory provisions contained in Part 1 of the Status of Children Act 
1969 are the most appropriate to determine whether Michael, Scott, and Jeremy are 
legal fathers. In all three of the above scenarios none of the men were married to the 
child’s mother at the time of conception so the statutory presumption of parenthood 
does not apply.
112
 Instead, Michael, Scott, and Jeremy can become the child’s legal 
father simply by signing the child’s birth certificate or an instrument acknowledging 
they are the child’s legal father jointly with the child’s mother.113 If Michael, Scott, or 
Jeremy oppose becoming the child’s legal father and refuse to sign the child’s birth 
certificate, the child’s mother can apply for a declaration of paternity under s 10 of the 
Status of Children Act 1969. The application can be made in the High Court or the 
Family Court.
114
 Alternatively she could apply for a paternity order under the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980.
115
 
 
A declaration of paternity will be made if the Court is satisfied that the relationship of 
father and child exists. The Supreme Court has determined that the relationship 
referred to in s 10 is the legal relationship between the father and child,
116
 and the Act 
provides that the existence of the relationship must be proven on a balance of 
probabilities.
117
 In the above scenarios it is clear that Michael, Scott, and Jeremy have 
a biological relationship with each respective child. The Supreme Court held in 
Hemmes v Young that while s 10 is not designed to be a vehicle for declaring 
biological relationships, proof of the fact of a biological relationship will in most 
cases justify a declaration that the legal relationship of father and child exists.
118
  
 
However, it should be noted that a declaration of paternity will be determined 
differently depending on whether it is made in the Family Court or the High Court. In 
the High Court, once the relationship of father and child has been proven on a balance 
of probabilities the Court has discretion to grant the declaration. In the Family Court, 
once the relationship has been proven on a balance of probabilities the Court must 
grant the declaration. In L v R
119
 Judge Whitehead rejected the argument that the High 
Court and Family Court should have concurrent jurisdiction because of the plain 
meaning of s10(5)(a) of the Act, stating that:
120
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 [31] When an application under s 10 of the Status of Children Act 1969 is made  to 
 the High Court, s 10(5)(b) states that the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act 
 1908 apply. The High Court's jurisdiction under that Act is discretionary. When the 
 application is made in the Family Court, s 10(5)(a) directs that the provisions of the 
 Family  Proceedings Act 1980 apply. Under the Family Proceedings Act, the Family 
 Court's  jurisdiction is not discretionary.   
 
Therefore, if an application is made in the High Court, the Court has discretion to 
grant the declaration even when a legal relationship has been proven. This leaves a 
very small window of opportunity for the Court to determine other factors, including 
the effect of lack of consent or deceit in relation to the child’s conception. However, it 
is very unlikely that a High Court would exercise its discretion and refuse to grant a 
declaration of paternity (or alternatively grant a declaration of non-paternity) in 
regards to a biological father who did not consent to the conception of the child or 
was deceived into becoming a father, unless a very strong argument was made. A test 
case has not yet arisen in New Zealand.   
 
In conclusion, a male who did not consent to becoming the biological father of a child 
or was deceived into becoming the biological father of a child is nevertheless the legal 
father of the child, so long as there is sufficient proof on a balance of probabilities that 
there is a biological relationship between the male and the child. The circumstances of 
the child’s conception have no impact on whether he is deemed the child’s legal 
father. At one end of the scale, if a male has unprotected sexual intercourse with a 
female resulting in a child, he is the legal father of the child. At the other end of the 
scale, if a male has protected sexual intercourse with a female but she took the used 
condom out of the rubbish and inseminated the discarded semen into herself without 
his knowledge or consent, the male is the child’s legal father.121 
C The main principles supporting the current legal framework  
The current legal framework is firmly based on core principle A: 
  (A) Legal parenthood is based on a biological relationship between the parent 
 and the child  
This is evident due to the fact that if it is proven on a balance of probabilities that 
there is a biological relationship between the male and the child, a legal relationship 
of father and child is established.  
The framework is also firmly based on principle C: 
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 (C) There should be certainty about the legal status of children in relation their 
 their parents 
In all scenarios involving non-consensual and deceitful natural paternity, the child’s 
biological father always becomes the child’s legal father. The circumstances of the 
child’s conception are entirely irrelevant for the purpose of determining legal 
parenthood. Therefore, there is always certainty about the status of the child in 
relation to their biological father. 
D Dissertation argument  
Principle A should remain the core principle in the current legal framework. 
Accordingly, a male who did not consent to becoming the legal father of a child or 
was deceived into becoming the legal father of a child should remain the child’s legal 
father. This is because there is no principled basis for an argument that males in such 
circumstances should not be the child’s legal father. Legal parenthood in the current 
context differs from non-consensual artificial paternity (discussed in the previous 
chapter) in this regard. In addition, a no exceptions rule that biological parenthood 
results in legal parenthood, regardless of the circumstances of the child’s conception, 
provides certainty in terms of the child’s status in relation to their biological father, in 
accordance with principle C.  
 
However, there is one partial principled exception to Principle A. Principle (D)(iii) 
provides that: 
 D(iii) The circumstances of the child’s conception can determine whether the 
 child’s  biological parent is liable to pay child support  
This principle provides a partial exception to principle A because although one aspect 
of legal parenthood is affected, namely child support liability, for all other purposes 
the biological parent is still the child’s legal parent. Accordingly, the legal provisions 
in regards to intestacy,
122
 family protection,
123
 and citizenship
124
 still have full force. 
 
Principle D(iii) is reflected in s 89Z of the Child Support Act 1991 and provides that: 
89Z Grant of exemption to victim of sex offence 
(1)  The Commissioner must, as soon as practicable after receiving an application 
 under section 89Y in respect of a liable parent and a particular child, exempt the 
 person from the payment of child support in relation to that child if— 
  (a) the application is made in accordance with that section; and 
  (b) the Commissioner is satisfied that the liable parent is a victim of a sex 
  offence; and 
  (c) the Commissioner is satisfied that either— 
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   (i) another person has been convicted of that sex offence; or 
   (ii) another person has been proved to have committed that sex  
   offence before a Youth Court; and 
  (d) in the opinion of the Commissioner, it is likely that the child was  
  conceived as a result of that sex offence. 
 
This provision was inserted into the Child Support Act 1991 by the Child Support 
Amendment Bill 2005. Hansard records show that Parliament formulated the 
provision with underage victims in mind, particularly underage boys who father 
children to older women. However, it is not a requirement that the victim be an 
underage victim when the sex offence occurred, instead ‘sex offence’ for the purposes 
of the section has a wide definition and means any offence under ss 127 to 144C of 
the Crimes Act 1961.
125
 It is a requirement that the sex offence is the subject of a 
conviction. Accordingly, an alleged sex offence will not provide grounds for an 
exemption.
126
  
 
Section 89Z is significant as it is the only provision in the Child Support Act 1991 
that fully exempts a biological parent from paying child support. Hansard records 
show that Parliament provided two rationales for this exemption. Firstly, the 
imposition of child support liability on victims of sex offences is unjust, and secondly, 
victims of sex offences should not be further victimised by being required to pay child 
support.
127
 These two rationales were regarded by Parliament as significant enough to 
override two of the main purposes of the Act: to affirm the right of children to be 
maintained by their parents, and the corresponding obligation of parents to maintain 
their children.
128
 
 
Applying these two rationales to cases of non-consensual natural paternity and 
deceitful natural paternity, it could be argued that if both rationales can be met, the 
biological father should be exempt from paying child support.   
1 Non-consensual natural paternity 
 
In scenarios involving non-consensual natural paternity, the biological mother and 
father had consensual sexual intercourse that resulted in the unplanned conception of 
the child. The conception of the child may have resulted from a lack of contraception, 
faulty contraception, or miscommunication regarding contraception. 
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In such scenarios the father of the child may not object to child support liability. 
However, he may object in certain circumstances if he believes he made it clear to the 
child’s mother that he did not want to have children before entering into a sexual 
relationship with her, if he disagrees with her decision to keep the child and not opt 
for an abortion or adoption, or if he believes the child’s conception was a result of her 
negligence.  
 
(i) Rationale 1: Is it unjust to require a male to pay child support if he did not 
consent to becoming the child’s legal father?   
 
It is argued that in scenarios where no contraception was used, it not unjust that the 
child’s biological father is liable to pay child support. This is for the simple reason 
that he consented to unprotected sexual intercourse, and as the conception of a child is 
a natural and foreseeable consequence of unprotected sexual intercourse, he has 
effectively consented to the conception of the child and thus child support liability. In 
cases where contraception has been used but for some reason was faulty, there is also 
a strong argument that child support liability is not unjust. This is because 
contraception is not 100% effective so when a person consents to sexual intercourse 
they are also consenting to the risk of conceiving a child and thus child support 
liability. In addition, where there has been miscommunication regarding contraception 
both parties will have been negligent in some way.  
 
The main legal argument why it is not unjust that the child’s biological father is liable 
to pay child support is because the biological mother and father of an unplanned child 
both have an equal statutory obligation to maintain the child under the Child Support 
Act 1991 as legal parents.
129
 The Act does not discriminate on the grounds of gender. 
 
However, there is one major counter argument that has arisen in recent years from the 
growing discourse on males’ reproductive rights. Namely, it is unjust that males have 
to pay child support for unplanned children because females have the ability to opt out 
of being the legal parent of an unplanned child (and thus child support liability) 
whereas males do not. In addition, upon the conception of an unplanned child, it is 
solely the female’s decision, whether it be to have an abortion, to give the child up for 
adoption, or to keep the child, that will determine whether the male becomes the 
child’s legal father and thus liable to pay child support. 
 
When an unplanned child is conceived the post-conception reproductive choices for 
males and females are very different. A female has three choices. Firstly, she can have 
an abortion in accordance with the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 
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1977; secondly, she can give the child up for adoption in accordance with the 
Adoption Act 1955; and finally, she can keep the child. 
 
In contrast, a male has no post-conception reproductive choice as the female’s 
decision will determine whether he becomes a legal parent and thus liable to pay child 
support. It has been argued that a male should have a legal right to be notified and 
consulted about decisions relating to abortion and adoption,
130
 or that a male should 
be able to veto a female’s decision if he disagrees with it.131 This dissertation does not 
agree with either of these propositions because the law on abortion and adoption is 
well established and allowing males to influence or veto female’s choices would 
fundamentally infringe upon female’s post-conception reproductive choices. It could 
result in scenarios where females are forced to have an abortion, give their child up 
for adoption, or endure an unwanted pregnancy and raise a child against their will. 
Therefore, males should not have post conception reproductive choice in regards to 
abortion and adoption. 
 
However, it has been argued that males should have a post-conception reproductive 
choice if a female decides the keep the child. This choice could take the form of a 
‘financial abortion,’ a concept proposed by Brown University Professor Frances 
Goldscheider.
132
 Brown describes a ‘financial abortion’ as the right to be notified 
about the conception of the child and to decide whether to undertake the legal rights 
and responsibilities of parenthood or not. She notes that such a decision would have to 
be made in a short window of time, and once the male has decided to have a financial 
abortion (or not), he is legally bound by his decision. Therefore, males would not be 
able to subsequently opt out of child support obligations they had previously 
committed to. Brown argues that the inequality between males and females in regards 
to reproductive choice needs to be addressed, commenting in an interview:
 133
 
 While I thought I was a feminist all my life, when I started studying the family and 
 fatherhood in general, I realized that I was really an egalitarian. I want a level playing 
 field in the family for men and women. 
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The right to a ‘financial abortion’ was explored in the American case of Dubay v 
Wells and Attorney General.
134
 The case sparked intense media interest and debate on 
males’ reproductive rights135 and was dubbed the male equivalent of the landmark 
judgment Roe v Wade
136
 which legalised abortion in the United States in 1973. The 
case concerned two university students who disagreed over their rights and 
responsibilities towards an unplanned child that was conceived as a result of their 
consensual sexual relationship. When the plaintiff, Matt Dubay, began dating the 
defendant, Lauren Wells, he claimed he made it clear that he was not ready to have 
children and wanted to take proper precautions to avoid an unplanned pregnancy. In 
response, Wells told him that she was probably infertile due to a medical condition 
and that as an extra layer of protection she was taking the contraceptive pill. The 
couple dated for several months then separated. Subsequently, Wells discovered that 
she was pregnant and decided to keep the child. Once the child was born she sued 
Dubay for child support. He objected and applied for a Court declaration that the 
Michigan Paternity Act
137
 and related statutes were unconstitutional, arguing that the 
Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which 
guarantees that no one state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
 
Dubay argued that the Act denied him the equal protection of the laws in two ways. 
Firstly, he argued that the Act denied him the equal protection of the laws by 
affording females a right to reject motherhood after engaging in consensual sexual 
intercourse by allowing the right to abortion while denying an equivalent right to 
males. Secondly, he argued that under the safe haven and abandonment laws in 
Michigan,
138
 a female has the right to unilaterally drop off a newborn at the hospital, 
police department, or clinic without any legal or financial recourse whatsoever, a right 
not afforded to males. In addition, he argued it is easier for a female to place a child 
for adoption, and again avoid being forced into unwanted parenthood. 
 
On appeal the Court upheld the decision of the trial judge and rejected Dubay’s claim 
on the basis that it is not a fundamental right of any parent, male or female, to sever 
financial responsibilities to their child after the child is born.
139
 In addition, the Court 
held that Dubay’s claim that a male’s right to reject fatherhood is analogous to a 
female’s right to abortion rests upon a false analogy because when a female exercises 
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her right to abortion, the pregnancy does not result in a live birth and there remains no 
child for the state to have an interest in supporting through child support. In the case 
of a male seeking to opt out of fatherhood and thereby avoid child support obligations, 
the child is already in existence and the state therefore has an important interest in 
providing for his or her support.
140
 In addition, the Court held that a female’s right to 
abortion is not solely, or even primarily, based upon her right to choose to be a mother 
after engaging in consensual sexual intercourse. Rather, it derives from the female’s 
right to bodily integrity and her privacy interest in protecting her own physical and 
mental health.
141
  
 
The Court rejected Dubay’s second argument stating that the safe haven and 
abandonment laws and the adoption laws in Michigan are gender neutral and are 
rationally related to a legitimate Government interest,
142
 therefore they were not 
enacted with a discriminatory intent or for a discriminatory purpose.
143
 Finally, and 
most importantly, the Court noted that Michigan paternity Act does not discriminate 
on the basis of gender and clearly stipulates that both parents have an equal obligation 
to maintain their child.
144
 After the judgment was delivered Dubay was asked by 
National Center for Men to appeal to the Supreme Court but he declined.
145
 
 
As Time magazine reported:
146
 
Dubay v Wells was a legal stunt, but as a way of calling attention to double standards 
and unintended consequences, the campaign makes sense.  
Indeed, the larger legal and certainly philosophical questions arising from the case 
are: should the different biological roles males and females play in reproduction 
solely determine their legal options? Is it inequitable that males have no legal options 
in regards to reproduction? Or are questions of equality not applicable in the context 
of reproduction? While outside the scope of this dissertation, ongoing consideration of 
these questions is needed because reproduction is fundamental to both males and 
females. As societal attitudes change, so too may the answers to these questions.  
 
However, for the present purposes, the main consideration is whether it is unjust to 
require a biological father to pay child support if he did not consent to becoming the 
child’s legal father. It is argued that because both male and female legal parents have 
equal statutory obligations under the Child Support Act 1991 to maintain their 
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biological children the answer must be no. The respective reproductive options of 
males and females are different prior to becoming legal parents but once both have 
acquired that legal status their obligations are identical. Therefore, if the legal father 
of an unplanned child is the non-custodial parent under the Act and the child’s legal 
mother is the custodian parent, the legal father is liable to pay child support to her. In 
the reverse situation where the legal father of an unplanned child is the custodian 
parent, the child’s legal mother is equally liable to pay child support to him. As in 
Dubay v Wells, the Act does not discriminate, in this respect, on the grounds of 
gender.  
 
(ii) Rationale 2: Is a male who became a legal father without his consent a 
victim who should not be further victimised by having to pay child support?  
 
In cases of non-consensual natural paternity, there has been no deceitful conduct to 
bring about the conception of the child so the male is therefore not a victim. Instead, 
the conception of the child was simply accidental and essentially resulted from the 
negligence of the male, female or both.  
 
In conclusion, as neither rationale 1 or 2 has been met, a partial exception to principle 
A by way of principle D(iii) is not justified in cases of non-consensual natural 
paternity. Therefore, biological fathers who do not consent to becoming legal fathers 
should remain liable to pay child support. 
2 Deceitful natural paternity 
 
Deceitful natural paternity results from consensual sexual intercourse or sexual 
activity and a deliberate deceitful act by the biological mother that resulted in the 
conception of the child. As in cases of non-consensual natural paternity, the father of 
the child may not object to child support liability. However, the father may object in 
certain circumstances on the grounds that the mother made a deliberate 
misrepresentation about contraception or fertility, or because he attempted to use 
contraception but the mother deliberately caused it to be ineffective. Alternatively he 
may object on the ground that the mother carried out a deliberate premeditated act 
independent of sexual intercourse to bring about the conception of the child.   
 
(i) Rationale 1: Is it unjust to require a male to pay child support if he was 
deceived into becoming the child’s legal father? 
 
In scenarios where the child’s mother lied about taking the contraceptive pill, 
deliberately stopped taking the contraceptive pill, or lied about being infertile (and 
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therefore no condom was used) one could argue it is not unjust that the male pay child 
support because he could have used a condom to prevent the conception of the child. 
Essentially it is up to him to use his own form of contraception and he cannot place 
the responsibility to prevent the conception of the child solely on the child’s mother. 
However, if the parties had an agreement that she take the contraceptive pill, it could 
be argued that she had an obligation to inform him when she stopped taking it.  
 
In scenarios where the child’s mother tampered with contraception, namely she 
pricked the condom before it was used, there is perhaps a stronger argument that child 
support liability is unjust. This is because the male has used a condom to prevent the 
conception of the child but the child’s mother deliberately made the condom 
ineffective to prevent the conception of the child.  
 
Finally, in scenarios where the conception of the child has resulted from semen being 
removed from a condom and subsequently inseminated there is perhaps an even 
stronger argument that child support liability is unjust. This is because the conception 
of the child has not resulted from sexual intercourse, which both parties consented to, 
but a separate deliberate act which the male did not consent to or was even aware had 
taken place. Where semen has been collected in the course of oral sex and 
subsequently inseminated, child support liability could also be regarded as 
substantially unjust as the conception of a child was not a natural or foreseeable 
consequence.   
 
While the various scenarios involving deceitful paternity are different with the 
resulting child support liability perhaps more unjust in some than others, there is a 
common thread that runs through all of the scenarios. Namely, while the male 
consented to the sexual activity, one could argue his consent has been vitiated due to 
the mother’s deceit. Therefore, the sexual activity was non-consensual.  
 
Lack of consent to sexual activity is a common thread through most sexual offences. 
While Parliament did not specifically discuss why it is unjust for victims of sex 
offences to be liable to pay child support, it is arguably because victims of sex 
offences did not consent to the sexual activity which resulted in the conception of the 
child. Therefore, they should not be liable for the financial consequences that flow 
from the conception of the child. On that basis, it is necessary to determine whether a 
deceived father did not consent to the sexual activity which resulted in the conception 
of the child. If he did not, he should perhaps not be liable for the financial 
consequences that flow from the conception of the child. 
 
42 Chapter 5 Non-consensual natural paternity and deceitful natural paternity 
 
Lack of consent to sexual activity has been thoroughly explored in the context of 
criminal law. In some circumstances it will be clear that the sexual activity was non-
consensual, although in circumstances where the victim has allowed the sexual 
activity, it may be less clear whether it was non-consensual. Section 128A of the 
Crimes Act 1961 provides a list of specific circumstances in which allowing sexual 
activity does not amount to consent. For example, a person does not consent to sexual 
activity if they are: affected by alcohol or drugs, affected by an intellectual, mental, or 
physical condition, mistaken about who the other person is, asleep, or unconscious. In 
addition, a person is not assumed to have consented because they did not protest or 
offer physical resistance to the activity. 
 
Two subsections of s 128A can be analysed in the context of deceitful paternity to 
determine whether the sexual activity which resulted in the conception of the child 
was non-consensual. Section 128A(7) provides that a person does not consent to an 
act of sexual activity if he or she allows the act because he or she is mistaken about its 
nature and quality. Section 128A(8) provides that s 128A does not limit the 
circumstances in which a person does not consent to sexual activity. Accordingly, the 
common law requirement that consent must be informed consent falls under  
s 128A(8).
147
 
 
Sections 128A(7) and 128A(8) are the most appropriate sections to determine whether 
the sexual activity in cases of deceitful paternity is non-consensual because they were 
recently interpreted by the Court of Appeal in arguably the most analogous context to 
deceitful paternity. Cases involving non-disclosure of HIV positive status between 
consenting sexual partners are arguably analogous because both involve two sexual 
partners who consented to sexual activity, and a failure by one to disclose important 
information which had significant consequences for the uniformed party, namely, 
HIV infection
148
 or the conception of a child.  
 
In KSB v Accident Compensation Corporation
149
 the Court of Appeal held that if a 
person fails to disclose their HIV status to a consenting sexual partner and engages in 
unprotected sexual activity with that partner, their conduct amounts to sexual 
violation for the purposes of a claim under ACC. The applicant in KSB did not 
consent to the sexual activity because she was mistaken about the nature and quality 
of the act (in accordance with s 128A(7)) and had not given full and informed consent 
(in accordance with s 128A(8)).  
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In determining whether the failure of the claimant’s partner to disclose his HIV status 
amounted to the definition of sexual violation, the Court of Appeal noted that apart 
from the Canadian Supreme Court judgment of R v Cuerrier,
150
 common law 
jurisdictions had not yet recognised that a failure to disclose HIV status can vitiate 
consent in regards to rape or other sexual offences. In addition, the issue had not been 
fully explored and tested in New Zealand criminal law, as previously such conduct 
had only resulted in a conviction of criminal nuisance under s 145 of the Crimes Act 
1961.
151
 
 
The first question the Court of Appeal considered was whether the complainant had 
been mistaken as to the “nature and quality” of the sexual activity she had consented 
to. It was noted that courts in England and Australia had taken a narrow approach and 
held that the mistake in cases of potential HIV infection is not about the nature and 
quality of the act (namely sexual intercourse) but rather its consequences (the risk of 
infection or harm).
152
 However, the Court of Appeal preferred a wide interpretation of 
s 128A(7) and considered that a mistake as to the “nature and quality” is not limited 
solely to a mistake about the physical act, it can also include the consequences 
flowing from the act. Following R v Cuerrier, which used a commercial definition of 
fraud in its reasoning, the Court held that unprotected sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not disclosed his or her HIV status changes the nature and quality of the act 
because of the associated risk of serious harm.
153
  
 
This leads to the question of what constitutes an “associated risk of serious harm” as it 
is a mistake about this risk which changes the nature and quality of the act. In KSB, 
the risk of serious harm was the risk of serious physical harm to the claimant’s health 
resulting from HIV infection.
154
 In cases of deceitful paternity, there is no risk of 
serious physical harm. However, there is arguably not only the risk of but actual 
serious harm of another nature, namely financial and psychological harm resulting 
from the conception of the child. The financial harm is 18 years of child support 
liability amounting to approximately $125,000,
155
 and the psychological harm will in 
the very least be considerable distress, but could also take the form of depression or 
another recognised mental injury.  
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Guidance on whether the cost of raising a child could be regarded as harm can be 
drawn from wrongful birth claims. Such claims have been made by parents who seek 
to claim damages for the cost of raising an unplanned child who was conceived as the 
result of a negligent sterilization procedure. In England, the cost of raising a child is 
not regarded as harm.
156
 In stark contrast, the cost of raising a child is regarded as 
harm in Australia and accordingly is recoverable.
157
 Furthermore, a recognised mental 
injury could be accurately described as harm as it attracts cover under ACC as a 
personal injury in some circumstances.
158
 
 
It should also be noted that in R v Cuerrier, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the 
definition of commercial fraud to determine whether deceitful conduct vitiates a 
person’s consent to sexual intercourse under criminal law. The definition provided 
that fraud is deception, resulting in deprivation. The Court explicitly applied this 
definition to cases of deceitful paternity, commenting:
159
 
 The commercial fraud theory of consent offers no principled rationale for 
 allowing some risks to vitiate consent to sex but excluding others.  For example, 
 pregnancy may be regarded as a deprivation in some circumstances, as may be the 
 obligation to support a child.  It follows that lying about sterility or the effectiveness 
 of birth control may constitute fraud vitiating consent.  
However, the Court later qualified this remark by stating that:
160
 
 The question of whether other categories of fraud could be logically added on the 
 basis that deceit as to them also fundamentally alters the nature of the physical act 
 itself, is better left for another day. It is doubtful that natural consequences, like 
 pregnancy, would qualify, as they are the natural concomitant of  the sexual act, and 
 do not fundamentally alter its nature. 
 
It is of note that pregnancy is not regarded as a ‘natural consequence’ in all legal 
contexts. For example, pregnancy is regarded as a personal injury when it results from 
rape or a treatment injury and therefore attracts cover under ACC. In Allenby v H and 
Others the New Zealand Supreme Court rejected the argument that pregnancy is not a 
personal injury because it is a natural process, commenting:
161
 
 I am not persuaded to a different view that a pregnancy is “a natural process” and is 
 necessary for the survival of the human species…. A woman is entitled to choose 
 whether or not to become pregnant. If she does not wish to do so, the consequences of 
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 her becoming pregnant are not to be discounted because pregnancy per se is a natural 
 process. A woman who takes steps to avoid a natural consequence of sexual 
 intercourse ought to be regarded as suffering physical injury when those natural 
 consequences follow as a result of medical misadventure.  
 
Overall, while there is an argument that the financial consequences resulting from an 
unplanned child is ‘harm’ for the purposes of deceitful paternity, due to the fact that 
there is conflicting authority in Australia and England and the issue has not been 
decided in New Zealand, it cannot be concluded that a deceived male’s consent to 
sexual intercourse is clearly vitiated under s 128A(7). In addition, while guidance can 
be drawn from Cuerrier and Allenby the reasoning does not clearly support an 
argument that consent is clearly vitiated under s 128(7).  
 
However, there is a strong argument that a deceived male’s consent is vitiated under  
s 128A(8) as he has not given informed consent to the act of sexual intercourse or 
sexual activity which resulted in the conception of the child. In KSB, the Court of 
Appeal accepted the conclusion of Randerson J in CLM v Accident Compensation 
Corporation
162
 that the concept of informed consent is well established as part of New 
Zealand law, and stated that if it had not been possible to decide the case under s 
128A(7):
163
 
 …we would have concluded that the present case fell within s 128A(8). That would 
 be consistent with the focus on the need for consent to be informed and the more 
 recent legislative history. 
As the claimant in KSB was unaware of the positive HIV status of her partner she was 
accordingly uninformed as to the very serious risk she was agreeing to, namely the 
risk of HIV infection.  
 
In scenarios involving deceitful paternity, the male was unaware of the mother’s 
deceit and was accordingly uninformed as to the very serious risk he was agreeing to, 
namely, the very high risk of the conception of a child. To put it another way, in cases 
of deceitful paternity the male has given informed consent to protected sexual 
intercourse, not unprotected sexual intercourse that will almost certainly result in the 
conception of the child. Similarly, in cases where sperm is collected and subsequently 
inseminated, it is clear that the male has not given informed consent to the sexual 
activity which resulted in the conception of the child. On that basis it is argued that 
the male’s consent is clearly vitiated under s 128A(8).  
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While KSB concerns an issue of criminal law it is important to note that the claimant 
was not attempting to argue that her former partner had committed sexual violation 
under the Crimes Act 1961. Rather she was arguing that her former partner’s actions 
constituted sexual violation for the purpose of her claim for cover for mental injury 
under the Accident Compensation Act 2001.
164
 For her claim to succeed all she 
needed to prove that non-disclosure of HIV status vitiates consent to sexual 
intercourse, in other words simply satisfy s 128A(7) or s 128A(8). The Court stated 
that it is not necessary for her to establish that her former partner did not believe that 
she consented to the act of sexual intercourse, and that he had no reasonable grounds 
for such a belief. This element would need to be satisfied if the case was heard under 
the Crimes Act 1961. In essence, the Court of Appeal created its own quasi-definition 
of sexual violation for the purposes of a claim under the Accident Compensation Act 
2001that is less stringent than the criminal definition. 
 
In cases of deceitful paternity the mother’s conduct would not amount to the 
definition of sexual violation under the Crimes Act 1961,
165
 although arguably it does 
meet the KSB definition of sexual violation as consent is vitiated under s 128A(8). 
Because the mother’s conduct does not amount to sexual violation under criminal law, 
a deceived father is not the victim of a sexual offence. Therefore, such fathers should 
not be entitled to a full exemption of child support in accordance with s 89Z of the 
Child Support Act 1991. However, because the mother’s conduct amounts to the 
definition of sexual violation under KSB (which resulted in a successful compensation 
claim under the Accident Compensation Act 2001) it is argued that child support 
liability under the Child Support Act 1991 should be affected in some way. Therefore, 
full child support liability in cases of deceitful paternity is unjust. 
 
(ii) Rationale 2: Is a male who has been deceived into becoming a legal father a 
victim who should not be further victimised by having to pay child support?  
 
As a deceived father meets the KSB definition of a victim of sexual violation, he is a 
victim in a legal sense. In a more general sense, he is a victim as he has been 
inherently deceived by the child’s mother who has taken away his ability to determine 
whether or not to become a biological parent. 
 
Parliament considered that requiring a victim of a sex offence to pay child support 
would result in on-going victimization as it would force the victim to have an on-
going link and potentially contact with the offender. They would essentially be bound 
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to the offender through a statutory obligation for the next 18 years and with each 
weekly payment they would be repeatedly victimised. Similarly, in cases of deceitful 
paternity, the deceived father is bound to the child’s mother for the next 18 years, and 
is forced to have an on-going link and potentially contact with her.  
E Recommendations 
In light of the analysis in section D, it is argued that both rationales have been met in 
cases of deceitful paternity. On that basis, males who are deceived into becoming 
fathers should not be liable to pay child support. However, this conclusion is subject 
to an important qualification that has been foreshadowed. Under s 89Z of the Child 
Support Act 1991, the applicant must be the victim of a sexual offence that resulted in 
a conviction in order to qualify for a full exemption to child support liability. 
Furthermore, if the conviction is quashed or set aside, the victim then becomes fully 
liable to pay child support. These are stringent requirements. To allow deceitful 
conduct in cases of deceitful paternity (that would not result in a conviction) to result 
in a full exemption would be inconsistent with this provision. Therefore, a full 
exemption for a deceived father cannot be justified. 
 
However, it is argued that because the two rationales have been met the Act should 
recognise that deceit can have an effect on child support liability. At present a legal 
parent can make an application under the Act for a departure order from the rigid 
child support formula where the facts are out of the ordinary.
166
 Section 105 provides 
a number of grounds for such an order. Deceit should be added as an additional 
ground for departure order so that a deceived father is eligible to apply for a departure 
order.  
 
The Family Court does not automatically grant departure orders if a ground is proven, 
instead the Judge is required to consider the individual facts and must be satisfied that 
the making of an order is just and equitable as regards the child, the qualifying 
custodian, the liable parent and is “otherwise proper.” This flexible approach allows 
the Court to make an individual determination on the facts which is appropriate in 
deceitful paternity cases because as previously noted, there is a range of deceitful 
conduct, with some conduct more deceitful than other conduct. Importantly, the Court 
will also consider whether the order is just and equitable as regards the child. 
Essentially, this new ground for a departure order provides a ‘middle ground’ of sorts 
for the father and child who are both victims of the mother’s deceit.    
 
It addition it is argued that adding deceit as a new ground for a departure order is 
necessary as it may discourage some women from deceiving men into becoming 
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fathers, and therefore less children will be born into such complicated family 
circumstances. At present there is no acknowledgement in any family law legislation 
that deceiving a person into becoming a biological and legal parent is behaviour that 
should be discouraged. This acknowledgement is necessary because such behaviour 
has significant psychological, financial and legal consequences for men and children.  
 
Recommendation 1: Insert deception as a ground for a departure order in s 105 of the 
Child Support Act 1991. 
 
105 Matters as to which court must be satisfied before making order 
(1) Where an application is made to a Family Court under section 104 for an order 
 in relation to a child and the court is satisfied that— 
 (a) 1 or more of the grounds for departure mentioned in subsection (2)  
 exists or exist; and 
 (b) it would be— 
  (i) just and equitable as regards the child, the qualifying custodian, and 
  the liable parent; and 
  (ii) otherwise proper,— 
  to make a particular order of the type specified in section 106,—  
the court may make the order. 
 (2)  For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), the grounds for departure are as follows: 
  (d) deception used by the biological mother of the child to bring about 
  the conception of the child 
(e) deception used by the biological father to bring about the 
conception of the child
167
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VI Misattributed Paternity  
A Introduction 
So far, this dissertation has focused primarily on determining whether, upon the birth 
of a child, the biological father of the child becomes the legal father of the child. 
Analysis of misattributed paternity raises a new set of issues as the legal relationship 
of parent and child has already been established but has been done so erroneously, as 
the legal father and the child do not share a biological relationship. 
 
Misattributed paternity is often referred to as “paternity fraud,” implying deliberate 
deceit on the part of the child’s mother. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, 
misattributed paternity means paternity involving the incorrect identification of the 
child’s biological father by the child’s mother either mistakenly, recklessly or 
intentionally. In scenarios involving misattributed paternity, the non-biological father 
and child are unaware that they do not share a biological relationship until the true 
paternity of the child is discovered or revealed.   
 
Misattributed paternity can have significant legal consequences for the child as well 
as the non-biological father, biological father and mother of the child. It can affect 
inter alia legal parenthood, maintenance, inheritance as well as guardianship and 
parenting orders relating to the child. Profound practical and psychological 
consequences can also affect the parties involved. The extent of the consequences 
resulting from misattributed paternity will largely depend on the length of time the 
child’s paternity has been misattributed.  
 
It is difficult to accurately determine how common misattributed paternity is, although 
international studies estimate the number of people who have a ‘misattributed’ father 
range from 1 to 8%,
168
 with the common consensus in New Zealand being 
approximately 1.8%.
169
 Based on New Zealand’s population of approximately 
4,430,000 people,
170
 about 80,000 people may have a ‘misattributed’ father. Of that 
80,000, approximately 16,000 are children aged 15 and under. This is a considerable 
number although presumably a very large percentage of both adults and children are 
unaware that their legal father is not their biological father.  
 
The main issue for consideration in this chapter is whether, upon the discovery of 
misattributed paternity, the child’s non-biological father should remain the child’s 
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legal father. This chapter also addresses the legal position of the child’s biological 
father, who may or may not have been aware that he has fathered a child. Subsidiary 
issues that can arise in scenarios involving misattributed paternity regarding 
guardianship, parenting orders, child support and parentage testing will also be 
addressed. 
B Under the current New Zealand legal framework, is a male who became the 
legal father of a child under the misapprehension he was the child’s biological 
father still the legal father of the child? 
 
To put this question into context, consider the following hypothetical scenarios: 
 
Scenario 1: Simon, 26, and Angela, 25, meet at a friend’s party and date for a couple 
of months. One day, Angela receives a txt from her ex-boyfriend, Tyler, also 25, 
saying he misses her and wants to get back together. Realising she still has feelings 
for him, Angela breaks up with Simon and she and Tyler immediately get back 
together although she does not tell Tyler about Simon. Two months later Angela 
realizes she is pregnant and assumes Tyler is the father. This comes as a bit of a 
surprise to Tyler but he accepts responsibility for the child and upon the birth of the 
child, signs the child’s birth certificate. As time passes, their relationship becomes 
strained and the couple separate a year after the child’s birth. Both agree to shared 
care of the child, with Angela being the primary caregiver. After a year of paying 
child support, Tyler starts having doubts as to whether he is the child’s father as he 
does not think the child looks like him. He asks Angela if she is certain that he is the 
child’s father and she says she thought he was, but upon telling him about her 
relationship with Simon admits there is a possibility that Simon is the child’s father.  
 
Scenario 2: Justin and Kate, both 42, were married for ten years. Two years into their 
marriage Kate gave birth to a child and Justin was named as the child’s father on the 
child’s birth certificate. However, for the first four years of their marriage Kate had an 
ongoing extra-marital affair with work colleague named Ben, who is the child’s 
biological father. Kate and Ben are both aware of this fact and agree to keep the 
child’s true parentage a secret as Kate wants to remain with Justin, and Ben is also 
married and wants to remain with his wife.  When the child is eight years old, Justin 
learns of Kate’s affair and the couple separate. Upon their separation Kate also 
informs Justin that Ben is the child’s biological father. 
 
Scenarios involving misattributed paternity are usually very complex and can have a 
range of legal outcomes. The child’s non-biological father may remain the child’s 
legal father after learning he is not the child’s biological father if he and the child’s 
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mother agree on such an arrangement and take no legal action. This is a likely 
outcome in scenarios where the non-biological father and mother decide to remain in 
relationship with each other. However, if the relationship breaks down, the non-
biological father may still wish to remain the child’s legal father due to the strong 
attachment to the child as a result of many years of parenting. Alternatively, if the 
parties agree that the non-biological father should not remain the child’s legal father, 
the information relating to the child’s birth can be amended171 by a registrar at the 
Births, Deaths and Marriages Office after the necessary enquiries have been made.
172
  
 
However, if the parties disagree as to whether the non-biological father should remain 
the child’s legal father, the issue will need to be resolved by the Family Court. 
Different types of proceedings may be filed by the mother and/or the non-biological 
father depending on the particular circumstances. In addition, the biological father 
may file proceedings if he is aware that he is the biological father of the particular 
child.  
 
In scenario one, Tyler, the non-biological father of the child, could apply for a 
declaration of non-paternity if he objects to remaining the child’s legal father.173 The 
application may be opposed by Angela, the child’s mother, for several reasons. 
Firstly, she may genuinely believe that Tyler is the child’s biological father. 
Alternatively, if she knows he is not the child’s biological father she may oppose the 
application in order to continue to obtain child support from him to pay for the cost of 
raising the child. As she and Tyler had a shared care arrangement, she may want him 
to have ongoing contact with the child for the child’s benefit, and to have someone 
share the practical responsibility of raising the child. In addition, she may be 
unwilling or unable to bring proceedings against Simon to establish that he is the 
father of the child.  
 
In order to be granted a declaration of non-paternity Tyler must prove on a balance of 
probabilities that the legal relationship of father and child does not exist between 
himself and the child. As per the Supreme Court in Hemmes v Young,
174
 proof of a 
biological relationship will usually be sufficient to prove that a legal relationship 
exists. Therefore, proof of the absence of a biological relationship will usually be 
sufficient to prove no legal relationship exists. In determining Tyler’s application, the 
                                                 
171
 Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, s 84. 
172
 Section 82. 
173
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 10(3). Doubt has been expressed about whether a person could apply 
directly for a declaration of non-paternity based on the wording of s 10, although the Family Court has 
subsequently considered and approved such direct applications – see most recently LTG-S v LRP 
[2012] NZFC 463. 
174
 Hemmes v Young [2005] NZSC 47. 
52 Chapter 6 Misattributed paternity 
 
Court will consider all the available evidence. The child’s birth certificate, which has 
been signed by Tyler, is existing prima facie evidence of paternity.
175
 Tyler and 
Angela may give evidence and the Court may call any witness whose evidence may 
be of assistance,
176
 including a lawyer for the child.
177
 The parties and witnesses are 
discouraged from giving misleading evidence by the Family Proceedings Act 1980 
which provides sanctions for the making of false statements that if made on oath 
would amount to perjury.
178
 
 
It may be difficult for the Court to determine whether Tyler is the child’s biological 
father based on evidence provided by Tyler, Angela and other witnesses, particularly 
if the evidence provided is unclear, contradictory or misleading. The results of a 
parentage test may therefore be the only way to conclusively determine if there is a 
biological relationship between Tyler and the child. The Court could adjourn the 
proceedings in order for a parentage test to be carried out, and allow time for a report 
on the results to be compiled and submitted to the Court as evidence.
179
  
 
It is important to note that the Court can only recommend a parentage test. It cannot 
order a parentage test.
180
 It is likely that Tyler would agree to undergo a parentage test 
as he needs to prove that there is no biological relationship between himself and the 
child. However Angela may, as the child’s guardian, refuse to allow the child to 
undergo the test. She may do so if she knows the results will conclusively prove there 
is no biological relationship between Tyler and the child. Subject to the right of 
Angela to explain the reasons for her refusal, the Court may draw such inferences 
from her refusal as appear proper in the circumstances.
181
  
 
If Angela were to refuse, Tyler could apply for the child to be put under the 
guardianship of the Court,
182
 and seek an order from the Court requiring the child to 
undergo a parentage test. Such an application will be granted if the Court concludes 
that it is in the welfare and best interests of the child to have issues concerning his or 
her paternity resolved.
183
 The Court has often referred to the right of the child to know 
                                                 
175
 Status of Children Act 1969, s 8(1). 
176
 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 165. 
177
 Section 162. 
178
 Section 53. 
179
 Section 54(1)(a)-(b). 
180
 The limited power of the Court was recently noted in M v Family Court at Waitakere HC Auckland 
CIV-2010-404-7814, 16 December 2010. 
181
 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 57. 
182
 Care of Children Act 2004, s 31. 
183
 The first successful application of this nature was granted by the Court of Appeal in T v S 
[Guardianship] [2005] NZFLR 466 (CA). 
53 Chapter 6 Misattributed paternity 
 
his or her parents,
184
 and determined that this right provides the basis for concluding 
that parentage testing is in the welfare and best interests of the child.
185
 However, 
applications of this nature are rarely applied for and rarely granted, as they are 
regarded as a measure of last resort. 
 
In conclusion, the ultimate outcome in scenario one will highly depend on the 
evidence available to the Court. If Tyler is granted a declaration of non-paternity, the 
legal relationship of father and child between himself and the child will come to an 
end. If the Court declines his application based on a lack of evidence, Tyler will 
remain the child’s legal father. It is also possible that Simon may apply for a 
declaration of paternity if he discovers he is the biological father of the child. 
Alternatively, Angela could apply for a declaration of paternity or a paternity order in 
regards to Simon if the Court declares that Tyler is not the child’s legal father.  
 
Scenario two is a very different scenario involving misattributed paternity as the child 
is much older (eight years of age at the time of the proceedings) and has a well-
established legal and emotional relationship with a man who is not their biological 
father, namely, Justin. Justin could apply for a declaration of non-paternity if he 
objects to remaining the child’s legal father. The same issues regarding evidence 
given by the parties and witnesses could arise as previously discussed in regards to 
scenario one, and the results of a parentage test may or may not be able to be 
obtained. In addition, as Justin was married to Kate when the child was conceived, he 
must rebut the statutory presumption that he is the child’s legal father.186   
 
As in scenario one, the child’s mother (Kate) may oppose the application. However, if 
the Court is satisfied that Justin is not the child’s biological father, a declaration of 
non-paternity will be granted. Even though Justin has been the child’s legal father for 
eight years, his application is not subject to the time limitations, as the Court has 
jurisdiction to grant a declaration of non-paternity at any point in the child’s life and 
even after the father, child or both have died.
187
 The Court has also rejected the 
argument that a non-biological father is estopped from applying for a declaration of 
non-paternity on the basis that he became aware that he was not the child’s biological 
father but nevertheless continued in the role of legal father for some time after.
188
 
Therefore, if Justin became aware of Kate’s affair and the fact that Ben is the child’s 
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biological father but did not apply for a declaration of non-paternity for some time, 
Kate could not argue that he is estopped from applying because he his mind. Kate 
could argue that because Justin and the child have a strong psychological bond that 
should form the basis of a legal relationship of father and child. The significance of 
the concept of ‘psychological parenthood’ has been recognized by the Court but only 
in regards to parenting orders, not legal parenthood itself.
189
  
 
Alternatively Kate could apply for a declaration of non-paternity upon her separation 
from Justin. This could occur if the parties have an acrimonious separation and Kate 
wishes to cut all ties with him. Such a course of action may be more likely to occur if 
she subsequently forms a stable relationship with Ben and they both plan on raising 
the child together. If Justin opposes the application because he wishes to remain the 
child’s legal father, he could argue that psychological bond between himself and the 
child should form the basis of a legal relationship. However, as previously discussed, 
such an argument has not yet been accepted by the Court. If the application was made 
in the High Court, the Court could exercise its jurisdiction and refuse to grant Kate a 
declaration of non-paternity despite the absence of a biological relationship, although 
this outcome is unlikely and no test case has arisen on this point. 
 
Once it has been established that the child’s non-biological father is no longer the 
child’s legal father, he is no longer a “parent” for the purposes of the Child Support 
Act 1991
190
 and accordingly, no longer liable to pay child support.
191
 Therefore, in 
scenario one and two, Tyler and Justin would no longer be liable to pay child support. 
There is also a provision in the Act that allows a previously liable parent to apply to 
the Court for a refund of child support from the custodian parent.
192
 As Tyler had 
previously paid child support he could attempt to recover it from Angela and if Justin 
paid child support to Kate after their separation, he could also attempt to recover it 
from her. However, the Court only allows child support to be recovered if it is “just 
and equitable for the purpose of adjusting or giving effect to the rights of the parties 
and, where appropriate, the child concerned.”193  
 
A declaration of non-paternity not only affects child support, but also inheritance. 
Notably, the child will no longer be entitled to pursue a claim under the Family 
Protection Act 1955 or on intestacy under the Administration Act 1969. 
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Scenarios involving misattributed paternity may result in mixed feelings for the non-
biological father. In scenario one and two, Tyler and Justin may wish to remain 
actively involved in the child’s life or to have some ongoing contact with the child. 
After a declaration of non-paternity has been made by the Court, the non-biological 
father could apply to be appointed a legal guardian of the child,
194
 or apply for a 
parenting order.
195
 The success of such applications will turn on what the Court 
considers to be in the welfare and best interests of the child. They are perhaps more 
likely to be applied for and granted in scenarios similar to scenario two as opposed to 
scenario one, as the child and non-biological father are likely to have a strong 
psychological relationship and regard each other as family despite the absence of a 
biological relationship.
196
 If Justin and Kate had other children during their marriage, 
who were Justin’s biological children, the Court may be more likely to approve a 
guardianship application or grant a parenting order as disrupting the child’s 
relationship with Justin may be very confusing and unsettling for the child as their 
siblings will still have contact with him.
197
 Angela or Kate may oppose such 
applications for various reasons, although opposition by the child’s mother (and 
perhaps the biological father) has not been regarded by the Court as determinative.
198
  
 
Finally, if in scenario one Simon became aware that he is the father of Angela’s child 
he may apply for a parenting order or apply to be appointed a guardian of the child. 
Similarly, if Ben wishes to take on a parenting role he could also apply for 
guardianship or a parenting order. 
C The main principles supporting the current legal framework  
The current legal framework is firmly based on principle A: 
 (A) Legal parenthood is based on a biological relationship between the parent 
 and the child 
This is evident as once it has been proven on a balance of probabilities that there is no 
biological relationship between the non-biological father and the child, the legal 
relationship of parent and child comes to an end as a result of a declaration of non-
paternity in accordance with principle D(ii): 
(D)(ii) Proof of an error (resulting from deceit or mistake) regarding the 
existence of a biological relationship between the legal parent and the child 
will end the legal relationship of parent and child 
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The circumstances surrounding the incorrect identification of the child’s biological 
father by the child’s mother, the length of time the non-biological father has been the 
child’s legal father, and the strength of the emotional relationship between the non-
biological father and child is irrelevant in terms of determining whether he should 
remain the child’s legal father. 
 
Strict adherence to Principle A and D(ii) provides certainty in terms of the child’s 
legal status in regards to their biological and non-biological father in accordance with 
principle C as it provides a no exceptions rule. Namely, if there is no biological 
relationship between the legal father and the child, the legal relationship can be 
severed, and if a biological relationship between another man and the child is proven, 
a legal relationship can be created. 
 
Finally, while the Court does not have the power to order a parentage test, it can 
require a child to undergo a parentage test if the child is placed under the guardianship 
of the Court. This outcome upholds principle F which provides that: 
 (F) Children should be able to access information about their genetic origins 
D Dissertation argument 
Principle A should remain the core principle in the current legal framework, 
supplemented by principle D(ii). This is because adherence to these principles is 
necessary in order to provide certainty in terms of the child’s legal status in regards to 
their biological and non biological father, in accordance with principle C. If legal 
parenthood in cases of misattributed paternity was decided on a case by case basis, 
and principles A and D(ii) were applied in an inconsistent manner depending on the 
particular facts of the case, this would result in uncertainty for the parties involved 
and inconsistent outcomes. In addition, the inconsistent application of principle A 
would result in a double standard where a non-biological father has the same legal 
responsibility towards a child as a biological father.  
 
Strict adherence to principle A, D(ii) and C may, depending on the particular 
circumstances, result in legal outcomes which may be considered contrary to the 
child’s welfare and best interests. For example, as a result of a declaration of non-
paternity, the child will only have one legal parent.
199
 This may be regarded as 
contrary to the child’s welfare and best interests as the child will only have one legal 
parent to provide them with financial support, and contact with a person whom they 
regard as their father may be cut off. However, as previously discussed earlier in this 
dissertation, the welfare and best interests of the child is not a relevant principle in 
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regards to determining legal parenthood. Therefore, there is no principled basis for 
arguing that the welfare and best interests of the child should determine whether a 
child’s non-biological father should remain the child’s legal father. This principle is 
only relevant in cases of misattributed paternity in regards to applications for 
guardianship, parenting orders, and determining whether a child should undergo a 
parentage test. Indeed, appointing the non-biological father a guardian of the child or 
granting a parenting order allowing the non-biological father contact with the child 
can mitigate some of the consequences flowing from misattributed paternity as both 
parties can continue to have a relationship. 
 
One could argue that in cases where the non-biological father and child have a well-
established psychological relationship there should not be strict adherence to principle 
A, and like adoption, misattributed paternity should provide an exception to principle 
A. In other words the law should recognise a second instance where the child can 
have a legal relationship of parent and child with a person whom they do not share a 
biological relationship.  
 
A male who has adopted a child is similar to a misattributed father in some respects. 
Neither has a biological relationship with the child although both have a legal 
relationship of father and child. However, there is one major difference. A male who 
has adopted a child has consensually entered into the legal relationship with the child 
fully aware that he has no biological relationship with the child. In contrast, a 
misattributed father has consensually entered into a legal relationship with the child 
fully unaware that he does not have a biological relationship with the child.  
 
As adoption and misattributed paternity are not entirely analogous, it would be 
difficult to justify that misattributed paternity should also provide an exception to 
principle A. In addition adoption usually requires the consent of the child’s biological 
mother which could be an issue in cases of misattributed paternity where the 
relationship between the parties has broken down.  
 
It is also of note that there are several procedural or technical aspects of the provisions 
relating to declarations of non-paternity and non-paternity orders that could be fixed. 
At present a male is unable to apply directly to the Court for a declaration of non-
paternity under the Status of Children Act 1969, nor for an order declaring that he is 
not the father of the child under the Family Proceedings Act 1980.
200
 Under both 
Acts, the Court can only make such a declaration or order on its own initiative, or on 
an application for the purpose by a party to current proceedings.
201
 In cases of 
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misattributed paternity, the paternity of the child has already been established so 
proceedings for a declaration of paternity or paternity order will not take place. 
Therefore, the non-biological father technically cannot bring proceedings to establish 
that he is not the father of the child. While the Family Court has accepted direct 
applications for declarations of non-paternity on a strained interpretation of the s 10 of 
the Status of Children Act,
202
 the wording of the section should be amended because it 
is inequitable that an application cannot be made directly by a male who is not the 
biological father of the child but can be made by the mother of the child. The 
provisions regarding applications for paternity orders should also be amended so that 
they are consistent with the provisions regarding declarations of paternity. Further 
explanation of the wording that should be used is provided in section five of this 
chapter.  
 
A further procedural issue is that in deciding declarations of non-paternity the Court 
has different jurisdiction depending on which Court the application was lodged. In the 
High Court, once the relationship of father and child has been established on a balance 
of probabilities, the Court has discretion to grant the declaration. In the Family Court, 
once the relationship has been established on the balance of probabilities, the Court 
must grant the declaration. It is argued that both courts should have the same 
jurisdiction when granting declarations of paternity (and non-paternity) as this 
removes any inconsistency in outcomes that could occur.  
 
Finally, while no substantive changes should be made to the current legal framework 
used to determine legal parenthood in cases of misattributed paternity, principle F 
should be given greater weight in the provisions concerning parentage testing. This is 
because children born as a result of an AHR procedure have a statutory right to access 
information about their genetic origins, whereas a present naturally conceived 
children have no statutory right to access information about their genetic origins. This 
inconsistency needs to be corrected as it is equally important that naturally conceived 
children know their genetic origins, particularly if they are in doubt. Furthermore, s 
5(f) of the Care of Children Act 2004, which provides that a child’s identity should be 
preserved and strengthened, arguably indicates that it is in the welfare and best 
interests of children to know their genetic origins, as they are a key aspect of the 
child’s identity. 
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1 Parentage testing  
 
The Law Commission highlighted parentage testing as an issue of concern in the 
report New Issues in Legal Parenthood, published in 2005.
203
 The Commission 
considered various issues under three main headings: the regulation of parentage 
testing in New Zealand; voluntary parentage testing; and Court intervention. In 
regards to Court intervention the Commission considered three options for 
recommendation. Firstly, the Court could continue to have the power to recommend 
parentage testing and to draw an inference when there is refusal to comply. Secondly, 
the Court could be empowered to order parentage testing and retain the ability to draw 
an inference as the only sanction if the order is resisted. Thirdly, the Court could be 
empowered to order parentage testing backed up by a range of possible orders to 
ensure compliance and the ability to impose penalties.  
 
After careful analysis the Commission chose to recommend option three.
204
 In doing 
so it commented:
 205
 
 It is in the best interests of the child, his or her parents and the general public that 
 parentage determinations are made on the basis of accurate DNA parentage testing. 
 Without this, determining parentage may be a difficult task and result in lengthy and 
 expensive court proceedings. The Court may have to rely on legal presumptions and 
 inferences, and the determination will not necessarily end speculation and rumour on 
 the issue. 
 
The Commission noted that the Family Court had recently, for the first time, ordered a 
parentage test upon placing the child under the guardianship of the Court.
206
 While the 
Court was faced with conflicting precedents and a lack of statutory authority, the 
parentage test was ordered on the basis that the Court was obliged to apply the 
provisions of the Guardianship Act 1968 in a manner that was consistent with the 
articles in UNCROC that refer to a child’s right to know his or her parents. The 
Commission endorsed the approach taken by the Court and recommended that it be 
given statutory authority to order parentage tests to give better effect to New 
Zealand’s international obligations under UNCROC to enable children to know their 
parents and genetic identity.
207
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In addition to the ability to order parentage tests, the Commission considered the 
consequences of non-compliance with an order and proposed that there be sanctions 
for non-compliance, commenting:
208
 
 While a punitive approach is not in harmony with the general ethos of family law to 
 facilitate relationships, the persistent refusal of some people to comply in good faith 
 with court directions can have serious consequences for the children and other parties 
 involved. 
As Parliament had recently considered incentives and penalties to ensure compliance 
with court directions in passing the Care of Children Act 2004, the Commission 
recommended sanctions for non-compliance with a parentage testing order made 
under the Family Proceedings Act 1980 should align with the relevant provisions of 
the Care of Children Act 2004. It noted that if issues regarding the compliance of 
certain orders cannot be resolved by counselling,
209
 the Court can issue a warrant for 
the enforcement of certain orders by a named person, social worker or the police.
210
 
The Commission therefore concluded an order for parentage testing should similarly 
be able to be enforced. 
 
While the Commission did not conclusively state what type of penalty should be 
imposed it noted that intentional obstruction of an order or execution of a warrant is 
an offence under the Care of Children Act 2004, with a penalty of imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $2500.
211
 For consistency, it 
concluded that the same penalty should apply in regards to a warrant to enforce a 
parentage testing order. 
 
Following the Commission’s report, a Members’ Bill was put forward which 
proposed that the Family Court should have the ability to order parentage tests, 
although the Bill was discharged in December 2008.
212
 An almost identical Members’ 
Bill was placed on the list of proposed Members’ Bills in February 2012 by National 
MP Nicky Wagner,
213
 although it has not yet been drawn out of the ballot to be 
debated before the House. Both Bills proposed that the Family Court should be able to 
issue a warrant to enforce an order for a parentage test and that intentional obstruction 
of warrant should carry a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three 
months or a fine not exceeding $2500.  
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The recommendations made by the Law Commission and proposed in the two 
Members’ Bills clearly reflect principle G, and balances out the current inconsistency 
between the ability of children conceived as a result of AHR procedures and naturally 
conceived children to access information about their genetic origins. Furthermore, if 
the Family Court can order parentage tests in cases of misattributed paternity, 
questions concerning biological relationships will be resolved more quickly and most 
importantly, with absolute certainty.  
 
It is also important to note that in cases of misattributed paternity where the child’s 
non-biological father and/or a biological father have Maori origins, information about 
the child’s genetic origins will be significant in terms of whakapapa and the 
information can have further legal consequences, for example, in regards to iwi 
membership. Similarly, it will be important for children with multiple ethnicities to 
have questions concerning their genetic origins answered as this could affect 
citizenship rights to other countries.  
 
Finally, it is also of note that parentage testing is not regulated in New Zealand. As 
pointed out by the Law Commission, there is no accreditation of parentage testing 
providers in New Zealand and while the results of parentage tests are highly reliable, 
the testing process is fraught with the potential for error. In addition, samples can be 
tampered with to skew the results, particularly when the samples are taken privately at 
home and sent to a parentage testing provider. Therefore the Commission 
recommended that the Government should develop standards and accreditation of 
laboratories offering DNA parentage testing in New Zealand, with particular attention 
to the accuracy of testing and verification of the identity of those providing the 
samples.
214
 It is very important that the results of parentage tests are accurate. 
Accuracy would be ensured if this recommendation was implemented.  
E Recommendations 
The following amended s 54, new ss 57(3), 57A and 57B reflect recommendation 8 of 
the Law Commission, and the proposed provisions in the two Member’s Bills relating 
to parentage testing. For clarity, the amendments to the existing provision are in 
italics.   
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Recommendation 1: Amend s 54 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
 
54 Parentage tests 
(1)  In any civil proceedings (whether under this Act or not) in which the parentage 
 of a child is in issue— 
 (a) the court may, of its own motion or on the application of a party to the  
 proceedings, order
215
 that parentage tests be carried out on— 
  (i) the child; and 
  (ii) any person who may be a natural parent of the child— 
  and that a report of the results be compiled, by a person who is  
  qualified to compile such a report, and submitted to the court;  
 (b) whether or not the court has made an order under paragraph (a), the  
 court may, of its own motion or on the application of a party to the  
 proceedings, adjourn the proceedings in order to allow time for such  
 parentage tests to be carried out and for such a report to be compiled  
 and submitted to the court. 
(2)  For the purposes of this section— 
 (a) parentage tests may be carried out by any person or persons who are 
 qualified to do so, whether or not any of them is the person by whom  
 the report is compiled; and 
 (b) the consent of a minor who has attained the age of 16 years to  
 submit to parentage tests shall have the same effect as the consent of a  
 person of full age. 
  
Recommendation 2: Insert new subsection 3 into section 57 of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980. 
  
57 Refusal of parentage tests 
(1)  In any civil proceedings in which the natural parentage of a child is in 
 issue, whether or not the court has ordered under section 54(1) that 
 parentage tests should be carried out on a person, evidence may be given to 
 the court as to the refusal of that person to consent (or, where the person is 
 under 16 years of age, as to the refusal to consent to such parentage tests of 
 the person who is competent to do so on that person's behalf). 
(2)  Subject to the right of the person who refuses to consent to the parentage 
 tests to explain the reasons for that person's refusal, and to cross-examine 
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 witnesses and call evidence, the court may draw such inferences (if any) 
 from the fact of refusal as appear to it to be proper in the circumstances 
(3)  The Court may
216
 issue a warrant authorising a member of the police or a 
 Social Worker or any other person named in the warrant to take the child 
 (using reasonable force if necessary) and to deliver the child for parentage 
 tests to any person referred to in section 54(2)(a) of this Act.” 
 
Recommendation 3: Insert new s 57A into the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
 
57A Execution of warrants
217
 
(1) For the purpose of executing a warrant issued under section 57, a member of 
 the Police or a social worker, or any other person named in the warrant may 
 enter and search any building, aircraft, ship, vehicle, premises, or place, with 
 or without assistance, and by force if necessary. 
(2)  The member of the Police, social worker, or other person executing the 
 warrant under section 57— 
 (a) must have that warrant with him or her; and 
 (b) must produce it on initial entry and, if requested, at any later time; and 
 (c) must identify himself or herself to any person in or on the building,  
 aircraft, ship, vehicle, premises, or place who questions his or her right to  
 enter and search the same or to take possession of the child; and 
 (d) if he or she is a member of the Police who is not in uniform, must  
 produce evidence that he or she is a member of the Police; and 
 (e) if he or she is a social worker, must produce evidence that he or she is  
 a social worker; and  
 (f) if he or she is a person (not being a member of the Police or a social  
 worker) authorised by the warrant to take possession of the child, must  
 produce evidence that he or she is the person so authorised. 
 
Recommendation 4: Insert new s 57B into the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
 
57B Resisting execution of warrant  
(1)  Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
 imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months, or a fine not exceeding 
 $2,500 who— 
                                                 
216
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welfare and best interests of the child to issue a warrant. 
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 (a) knowingly resists or obstructs any person executing a warrant under  
 section 57(3); or 
 (b) knowingly fails or refuses to afford immediate entrance to all or a part  
 of any premises to any person executing a warrant under section 57(3).   
  
Recommendation 5: The Government should develop standards and accreditation of 
laboratories offering DNA parentage testing in New Zealand, with particular attention 
to the accuracy of testing and verification of the identity of samples and persons. 
 
This recommendation mirrors recommendation 4 of the Law Commission. 
 
Recommendation 6: Insert new subsection 10(3A) into the Status of Children Act 
1969 to allow for an eligible person to apply directly for a declaration of non-
paternity. This would allow a non-biological father to apply directly. 
 
(3A) A Family Court or the High Court may make a declaration of non-paternity 
 (whether the alleged father or the alleged child or both of them are living or 
 dead) if— 
 (a) an eligible person applies to the court for the declaration; and 
 (b) it is proved to the court's satisfaction that the relationship does not exist 
 
Recommendation 7: Amend s 47 and delete s 51 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
 
Section 47 is an amalgamated version of ss 47 and 51. It provides the same test for 
determining paternity or non-paternity as provided in s 10 of the Status of Children 
Act 1969 and the same definition of an eligible person. However it retains the 
provisions regarding the effect of paternity order and the provision that provides who 
a paternity order can be made against. The Family Court’s power is discretionary as it 
is for the High Court when making declarations of paternity and non-paternity. 
 
It is of note that amendments to the provisions were suggested in the Family 
Proceedings (Paternity Orders and Paternity Tests) Amendment Bill 2008 and are 
currently proposed in the Family Proceedings (Paternity orders and paternity tests) 
Amendment Bill 2012. However this dissertation does not adopt the wording of the 
Bills, instead opting for wording consistent with s 10 of the Status of Children Act 
1969. 
 
 
 
 
65 Chapter 6 Misattributed paternity 
 
47 Paternity orders 
(1) In this section, eligible person means a person— 
 (a) who is a woman and who alleges that a named person is the father of  
 her child; or 
 (b) who alleges that the relationship of father and child exists between the  
 person and another named person; or 
 (c) who wishes to have it determined whether the relationship of father  
 and child exists between 2 named persons, and has a proper interest in the  
 result 
(2) The Family Court may make a paternity order if— 
 (a) an eligible person applies to the court for the declaration; and 
 (b) it is proved to the court's satisfaction that the relationship exists 
(3) The Family Court may make an order of non-paternity  if— 
 (a) an eligible person applies to the court for the declaration; and 
 (b) it is proved to the court's satisfaction that the relationship exists 
 (4)  An application for a paternity order in respect of a child may be made only 
 against a male who— 
 (a) is not married to, or in a civil union with, the mother; and 
 (b) has never been married to, or in a civil union with, the mother or (if he  
 has been married to, or in a civil union with, the mother) whose marriage  
 or civil union was dissolved before the conception of the child 
(5) For the purposes of proceedings under section 74, a paternity order in respect 
 of a child shall be conclusive evidence that the person against whom it is made 
 is the father of the child. 
 
Recommendation 8: The Family Court and High Court should have the same 
discretionary jurisdiction when granting declarations of paternity or non-paternity and 
the Family Court should have discretionary jurisdiction when granting paternity 
orders or orders of non-paternity.  
 
This removes the current inconsistency and provides both courts with the same 
discretionary jurisdiction. It would require s 10(5) of the Status of Children Act 1969 
to be amended in some manner.  
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VII Misattributed paternity tort claims 
A Introduction  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Family Court proceedings concerning 
misattributed paternity can have a range of legal outcomes for all the parties involved. 
Depending on the outcome and potentially the level of animosity between the child’s 
mother and non-biological father, separate tort proceedings may be brought by the 
child’s non-biological father against the child’s mother. 
 
In this chapter, the elements of deceit and negligent misstatement are analysed, using 
various fact patterns to determine whether a successful claim could be brought in New 
Zealand. The application of the torts to cases of misattributed paternity in England, 
Australia and Canada is then discussed to determine which approach may be adopted 
in New Zealand and ultimately whether such a claim may be barred on public policy 
grounds. Finally, the possibility of tort claims regarding non-consensual and deceitful 
natural paternity is briefly discussed.  
B Deceit and negligent misstatement 
The tort of deceit emerged in the context of commercial transactions in the late 
1700s.218 While the tort is still predominantly used to claim damages for deceitful 
conduct in a commercial context, it has also been successfully pleaded in an 
employment context, and has slowly begun to emerge in a domestic context. The tort 
provides a legal remedy for harm suffered as a consequence of fraud, although as 
Viscount Haldane emphasised in Nocton v Lord Ashburton,219 the concept of fraud is 
wider in some legal contexts than in others. The leading New Zealand case, Amaltal 
Corporation Ltd v Mahura Corporation,220 confirmed that the tort of deceit requires: 
(a) proof of a false representation as to a past or existing fact made by a 
defendant; 
(b) who knew it to be untrue or who had no belief in its truth or who was reckless 
as to its truth;  
(c) intention that the plaintiff would act in reliance on the representation;  
(d) action by the plaintiff in reliance on the representation; and  
(e) proof the plaintiff has suffered damage as a result of relying on the 
representation. 
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Liability for negligent misstatements was extended by the groundbreaking decision of 
Hedley Byrne221 in which the House of Lords held that a duty of care could lie in 
making a statement or giving advice to another person. Like deceit, negligent 
misstatement has predominantly been pleaded in the context of commercial disputes 
although it has also emerged in a domestic context. Under the principle laid down in 
Hedley Byrne, as explained and applied in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman,222 there 
are what could be described as four elements that need to be proven:  
(a) the maker of a statement owes a duty of care to persons who they are 
  closely and proximately connected with; 
(b) who are intended to rely on the statement for a particular purpose; 
(c) who do rely on it for a particular purpose; and  
(d) who suffer loss as a consequence of their reliance. 
 
While the torts of deceit and negligent misstatement have been pleaded in the context 
of misattributed paternity in both common law and civil jurisdictions, this dissertation 
concentrates on decisions from common law jurisdictions, namely England, Canada 
and Australia, as New Zealand courts are likely to look to developments in these 
countries for guidance. As a general overview, in England deceit claims for 
misattributed paternity can be brought between a former ‘cohabitating couple’.223 In 
Australia, deceit claims between former spouses are barred on public policy grounds, 
but could potentially be brought between parties who had a fleeting sexual 
relationship.224 Negligent misstatement claims can be brought in Australia between 
‘sexual partners’225 and in Canada, deceit and negligent misstatement claims between 
spouses were initially barred,226 but now appear to be allowed.227 Overall, legal 
precedent is inconsistent so it is difficult to predict what stance will be adopted in 
New Zealand. 
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C Proving the elements of deceit  
In the following section each of the five elements of deceit defined in Amaltal 
Corporation Ltd v Mahura Corporation,228 are analysed. Five judgments are drawn 
upon. In A v B229 the Court concluded all the elements of deceit were made out and 
accordingly provided analysis of each element. In Magill v Magill the County Court230 
and the Court of Appeal231 discussed all the elements of deceit although the High 
Court232 did not, as the sole issue on appeal was whether such claims should be barred 
on public policy grounds.233 However, Gummon, Kirby and Crennan JJ (in a joint 
judgment) discussed whether silence amounts to a false representation in the context 
of marriage and the need for reliance on the representation. Finally, in MacDonald v 
Gray,234 the Judge considered both deceit and negligent misstatement, providing 
specific guidance on some elements of deceit but not others, as the deceit claim 
ultimately failed. Overall, the cases provide a patchwork of guidance on the various 
elements.
235
  
1 False representation  
Firstly, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a false representation, namely 
a false representation that the plaintiff was the biological father of the relevant 
child.
236
 The falsity of the representation is easily proven by a parentage test but the 
representation itself may take several forms and be difficult to prove. The most clear 
cut example of a false representation would be if the defendant said to the plaintiff 
“you are the father” or words of similar effect. Upon being informed by the defendant 
of her pregnancy, the plaintiff in A v B asked the defendant whether he was the father 
of the child, to which she replied that he was. When the plaintiff became suspicious of 
the child’s true paternity several years later due to the child’s physical appearance, he 
put the question to her a second time and she replied that she had “not been with 
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anyone else.” Accordingly, the Court had no hesitation in finding that the defendant 
had made a clear unequivocal false representation on both occasions.  
 
However, often such a specific express representation may not have been made. 
Instead the defendant may have implied through words and conduct that the plaintiff 
was the child’s biological father by requesting or simply allowing him to sign the 
child’s birth registration forms, and stipulating that the child take his surname or a 
hyphenated surname containing the surnames of both parties. In A v B the Court held 
that, in addition to the statements made by the defendant, the completion of the child’s 
birth registration form by the defendant naming the plaintiff as the child’s father was a 
false representation. Similarly, in the first instance the County Court Judge in Magill 
concluded that the “most direct evidence” of a representation was the defendant’s 
completion and presentation to the plaintiff of a birth registration form in which she 
had named him as the father of the child.
237
 On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed 
with this finding although the High Court held that for public policy reasons, false 
representations could not be made within a marriage in this context.  
 
Usually the main ‘representation’ is silence as to the child’s true paternity. In the first 
instance the plaintiff in Magill pleaded a number of representations that involved 
silence, namely: the defendant’s concealment of her adultery; the concealment of her 
uncertainty and suspicions as to paternity; her silence when the plaintiff acted as a 
father to the children; and the continued concealment of her increasing doubts about 
paternity. However, the County Court Judge did not determine whether these 
amounted to false representations as the birth registration forms were the only 
representations that the Judge tested against the elements of deceit, as he considered 
them to be the most direct evidence of a representation.238 On appeal, the High Court 
provided some guidance on the issue, noting that in general terms silence will only 
constitute a misrepresentation if there is a legal or equitable duty to disclose 
something. Therefore, as there is no duty to disclose an extra-marital affair, the 
defendant’s silence was not a representation. In contrast, Wisbey CDJ in MacDonald 
v Gray held that as the plaintiff’s ‘sexual partner’, the defendant had a duty not to 
advise the plaintiff he was the father of the child if the position could be otherwise.
239
  
2 That the defendant knows is untrue, is reckless as to its truth or has no genuine 
belief in its truth  
When determining the state of mind of the defendant at the time the false 
representation was made, a New Zealand court could look at the circumstances 
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surrounding the conception of the child. Evidence of the frequency of sexual 
intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff (and biological father), the 
estimated date of conception, the use of or failure to use contraception, and any 
pregnancy tests taken around the time of conception could be taken into account.  
 
In Magill, the defendant had a long term extra-marital relationship with the same man 
that commenced soon after the birth of her first child to the plaintiff and continued for 
several years, during which time she gave birth to two more children. Contraception 
was not used. The County Court Judge concluded that the evidence clearly indicated 
that the defendant was having more frequent sexual intercourse with her lover than the 
plaintiff, and by the birth of her third child the frequency of sexual intercourse 
between the plaintiff and defendant was minimal if not non-existent. In cross-
examination the defendant acknowledged that when she became pregnant with her 
first child: 240 
It was a stressful situation. As I said, I had an uncertainty but still thought it was 
going to be my  husband's child and the easiest way for me to deal with it was to 
simply block it out.  
As to her state of mind the County Court Judge concluded that the evidence pointed 
very strongly in favour of the conclusion that when the defendant filled in the birth 
registration forms she knew the plaintiff was not the father of either of the children, or 
in the very least was reckless as to the truth of her assertion or had no genuine belief 
in it. On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed with County Court Judge, concluding that 
the defendant’s representation that the plaintiff was the father of the children was “at 
best a half truth.”241 
 
In assessing the defendant’s state of mind at the time she made the representation, a 
New Zealand court could determine whether there is consistency between the 
evidence given by the defendant in examination in chief and cross-examination. In 
addition, the Court could look at evidence given by the defendant in previous 
proceedings concerning the determination of the child’s paternity. In A v B the 
defendant alleged that although she had a one night stand with another man during her 
on and off again relationship with the plaintiff, she was certain the plaintiff was the 
father because he was her main sexual partner during the time of the child’s 
conception. However, the Court noted that the defendant’s evidence regarding the 
alleged one night stand was inconsistent between proceedings and ultimately 
concluded she was not a credible witness, implying she had perhaps fabricated the one 
night stand and in fact had another regular sexual partner during the time of the 
child’s conception. The Court stated that even if it had accepted her evidence that she 
                                                 
240
 Magill v Magill [2005] VSCA 51 at [59]. 
241
 Ibid, at [64]. 
71 Chapter 7 Misattributed paternity tort claims  
 
had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff three times during the relevant menstrual 
cycle and only once with her other sexual partner, she could not be 100% certain who 
the father was as she had not used contraception with either partner.
242
 
  
It is important to note the Court must determine the state of mind of the defendant at 
the time she made the representation. It cannot take into account her state of mind at a 
later time after the representation was made. In many cases of misattributed paternity 
the defendant’s doubt as to the paternity of the child may increase as time goes on. In 
Magill the defendant admitted she became more suspicious that one of her children 
was fathered by the man with whom she was having an affair and not the plaintiff 
when she compared a photo of the man and the child several years after the child’s 
birth. However, the County Court Judge concluded that her admission was not 
relevant in regards to determining her state of mind at the time she named the plaintiff 
on the birth registration forms. 
 
In most circumstances it may be relatively straightforward to determine that the 
defendant in the very least had no genuine belief in the representation. However, it is 
possible in some circumstances that this requirement will not be satisfied. Indeed, 
Wisbey DCJ held in MacDonald v Gray that there was sufficient evidence that the 
defendant held a genuine belief that the plaintiff was the child’s father as she took a 
pregnancy test shortly after a one-off sexual encounter with the child’s actual father 
which gave a negative result. He commented that his impression of the defendant was 
that she was naïve with a rather simplistic perceptive capacity, and that although 
someone of more acute perception or reasoning capacity may not have solely relied on 
a single pregnancy test and dismissed the possibility that the plaintiff was not the 
father, he was satisfied that her belief was honestly held.243 However, her failure to 
advise the plaintiff of the possibility that he may not be the child’s father as she had 
another sexual partner around the time of the child’s conception still gave rise to 
liability under the tort of negligent misstatement. 
 
Overall, both the English and Australian judgments demonstrate that determining the 
state of mind of the defendant is a subjective test, not an objective test. 
3 The defendant intended that the plaintiff would act in reliance on the 
representation 
This requirement may be straightforward to establish by way of evidence or upon 
admissions made by the defendant in cross-examination, although linking intention to 
reliance on a representation may be difficult to establish. 
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In A v B it was clear that the defendant intended that the plaintiff would rely on the 
representation and accordingly help raise the child as she admitted such when pressed 
in cross- examination. However in Magill, the defendant claimed that she did not 
intend the plaintiff to rely on the birth registration forms for any purpose other than 
signing them and agreeing that the children should be registered with the family name 
of Magill. When asked of her intention at the time she asked the plaintiff to sign the 
birth registration forms she stated: “I don’t think I really thought too hard about it at 
all, it was a birth registration.”244 The Court of Appeal concluded that her evidence 
was “redolent of candor” and accordingly that there was no evidence she intended the 
plaintiff to rely on the forms other than for a specific administrative purpose.245 
4 The claimant does rely on the representation 
This requirement is usually straightforward to establish if there is evidence that the 
plaintiff changed his behaviour after the representation was made, for example, if he 
supported the defendant financially throughout her pregnancy or cared for the child 
physically, financially and emotionally. However, it is crucial that reliance is linked to 
the specific representation that is pleaded by the plaintiff. 
 
In A v B the Court had no hesitation in finding that the plaintiff relied on the 
defendant’s representation as he paid for the defendant’s living expenses during her 
pregnancy, and once the child was born he physically cared for the child and paid for 
the costs related to the child’s care and upbringing. In addition, after the parties 
separated he continued to be an active parent and paid child support and maintenance 
to the defendant. The Judge was satisfied that the plaintiff’s behaviour was 
substantially motivated by the numerous representations and it was highly significant 
that he made no payment of any sort to the defendant before the first representation 
was made, and none after he received the results of a parentage test which determined 
that he was not the child’s father.  
 
However, linking reliance to the specific representation pleaded by the plaintiff will 
not always be straightforward as demonstrated in Magill. In the first instance, the 
County Court Judge concluded the plaintiff had relied on the birth registration forms 
as he helped raise the two children and continued to pay child support after he and the 
defendant separated.  In addition, he ceased to make child support payments once he 
found out that he was not the father of the children. However, on appeal the Court of 
Appeal held that while the birth registration forms were a representation as to 
paternity there was no evidence that the plaintiff relied on them for any other purpose 
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than signing them and agreeing that the children be registered with the family name of 
Magill.246 The Court considered it crucial that when the plaintiff was asked in 
evidence why he believed he was the father of the two children he made no reference 
to the birth registration forms and gave no evidence that the completion of the forms 
induced him to do anything. Rather, he stated that he cared for the children and 
provided financial support because he had no reason to believe that he was not the 
father of the children.
247
 Therefore the Court held that his reliance was on a general 
assumption that he was the father of the children which was based the marital context 
and numerous statements and conduct of the defendant not the birth registration 
forms.248 The High Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, with Heydon 
J specifically commenting:249 
 The request for the husband's signature did not call for him to make a particular 
 decision leading to a significant change of circumstances on his part. It would not 
 have appeared to him to be a representation made in order to obtain some advantage. 
 To him the form must have seemed to be no more than a routine administrative 
 document of the kind which parents have to fill in on many occasions in life. 
5 Damage  
Deceit is not actionable per se as it requires proof of damage, which in the current 
context may be difficult to prove. Firstly, the plaintiff must show a link of causation 
between the reliance and the damage suffered. Secondly, the damage must be 
reasonably foreseeable. Finally, the damage must be quantifiable. In Magill and A v B 
the respective courts highlighted the inherent difficulty in quantifying damages in this 
context. For example, in Magill the Court of Appeal commented that:
250
 
The present case falls not within a category of cases involving guesswork, but as one 
permitting rational assessment, albeit with some uncertainty.  
As a general overview £22,400 was awarded in A v B, $8,000AUD in MacDonald v 
Gray and $70,000AUD in Magill, although this award was overturned on appeal. 
 
(i) Financial damage 
Several types of financial damage have been awarded, for example, the costs 
associated with the defendant’s pregnancy,251 the birth of the child,252 and the cost of 
bringing legal proceedings against the defendant to determine the child’s paternity.253  
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The most contentious type of financial damage is the cost of raising the child, which 
will also usually be the main cost incurred by the plaintiff. For guidance on whether 
this type of damage can be claimed, courts have drawn on wrongful birth claims 
brought by parents who sought to recover the cost of raising an unplanned child who 
was conceived as the result of a negligent sterilization procedure. In Magill the 
County Court held that costs associated with raising the children were recoverable, 
following Cattanach v Melchior,
254
 while in A v B, the Court held that the costs 
associated with raising the child were not recoverable, following McFarlane v 
Tayside Health Board.
255
 
 
In Magill the County Court Judge awarded the plaintiff $35,000 for the economic loss 
incurred as a result of raising the two children. Of this $35,000, $10,000 was 
attributed to a loss of earnings incurred when the plaintiff took time off work after the 
birth of the children. The remaining $25,000 was awarded for expenses incurred while 
the paternity of the children was resolved in the Family Court, which took some time. 
A further $5,000 was awarded for future economic loss. On Appeal, the Court of 
Appeal commented that it was open to the Judge to award these sums. The Court also 
considered whether the costs of raising the children could be offset by the benefits 
obtained by the plaintiff, namely the affection and companionship from the children, 
but concluded it was not open for the Court to do so as this approach was not 
approved by the High Court in Cattanach v Melchior. Finally, it is of note that the 
County Court Judge expressly stated that he was not, in effect, refunding child support 
payments which had previously been made, rather the sum awarded was for additional 
financial support provided to the children.
256
  
 
In contrast to Magill, the Judge in A v B refused to classify the cost of raising the child 
as damage, following McFarlane v Tayside Health Board. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s 
attempt to recover the cost of nappies, formula, nursery furniture, pushchairs as well 
as nursery and school fees was unsuccessful.
257
 The Judge endorsed the approach 
taken in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board that:
 258
 
 The law must take the birth of a normal, healthy baby to be a blessing, not a 
 detriment. It brings joy and sorrow, blessing and responsibility. The advantages and 
 disadvantages are inseparable.  
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He also noted that in P v B,
259
 in which the application of deceit to cases of 
misattributed paternity was decided as a preliminary issue, the Judge expressed 
reluctance to regard a human relationship as a loss.
260
 On that basis he refused to 
award damages to refund the numerous cheques the plaintiff had given the defendant 
throughout the child’s life to cover the cost of raising the child.261 However, he did 
award the plaintiff half the cost of holidays and restaurant meals involving the child, 
totaling £14,900, classifying these as ‘luxury items’ in the sense that they were not 
necessary for the furtherance of the relationship between the plaintiff and the child.   
 
As courts in England and Australia have opposite views on whether the cost of raising 
a child is considered damage it is difficult to predict the view a New Zealand court 
would adopt. The Supreme Court recently confirmed that a pregnancy is a treatment 
injury when it results from a failed sterilization procedure, and therefore attracts cover 
under ACC.
262
 This conclusion may influence a New Zealand court to award damages 
for the cost of raising child. However, it is clear that child support payments would 
not be regarded as damage in New Zealand as there is provision for the refund of 
child support payments in the Child Support Act 1991.
263
 
 
(ii) Psychological damages 
The plaintiff may suffer distress, anxiety or depression as a result of learning they are 
not the biological father of the child or children they had raised.  
 
In Magill, the County Court concluded that as a result of the defendant’s 
representation the plaintiff had suffered severe anxiety and depression and 
accordingly awarded him $30,000AUD.  While the Court of Appeal agreed that the 
sum awarded by the County Court was appropriate, it disagreed that the plaintiff 
could prove a causal link between his psychiatric condition and the representation 
made. Therefore it overturned the award. In the High Court, Gummon, Kirby, 
Crennan JJ (in a joint judgment) agreed with the Court of Appeal and further 
commented that:
264
   
 In an action such as this it will always be difficult to establish whether the pain and 
 suffering alleged by the husband is truly caused by a false representation or is a 
 compound reaction to the distress occasioned by the discovery of what is felt as 
 betrayal and the breakdown of the marriage that it has occasioned. Acknowledging 
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 this is to recognise the inherent difficulty of establishing reliance (and causation) in 
 such cases. 
 
In A v B the Court compared the plaintiff’s mental state to the plaintiff in Magill, 
concluding that while he was devastated by the disclosure as he felt a deep sense of 
loss and suffered great unhappiness, his mental state had not required medical 
attention so it was not as severe a case as Magill. On that basis, the Judge made a 
smaller award of £7,500. In quantifying the sum the Judge drew guidance from the 
current payment for bereavement under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 which is 
£10,000. 
 
In MacDonald Wisbey DCJ considered that the plaintiff had suffered minimal or 
perhaps no emotional distress as he discovered that he was not the father of the child 
very early on in the child’s life. In addition, he only had limited contact with the child 
so he had not formed a significant emotional bond. 
 
A New Zealand court could draw guidance from nervous shock cases, which require 
proof of a diagnosable mental injury. Guidance could also be drawn from ACC claims 
for mental injuries. Because both nervous shock claims and claims under ACC require 
a diagnosable mental injury, it is doubtful that a plaintiff would be awarded damages 
for mere distress. 
 
(iii)Vindicatory damages 
A nominal sum could be awarded to mark the wrong suffered by the plaintiff or to 
recognize the plaintiff’s loss of dignity or autonomy.265 This would reflect the 
approach taken in the wrongful birth case of Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital
266
 
in which £15,000 was awarded to recognise that the plaintiffs had lost the ability to 
limit the size of their family and to recognise the wrong done by the hospital. While 
the award of vindicatory damages was not discussed in A v B, Magill or McDonald 
they could be awarded by a New Zealand court as an alternative to awarding damages 
for the cost of raising the child. 
 
(iv) Exemplary or punitive damages  
This type of damage is not intended to compensate a plaintiff but to punish and deter a 
defendant guilty of outrageous or contumelious conduct.
267
 Exemplary damages were 
not awarded in A v B, Magill or McDonald but could possibly be claimed depending 
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on the particular facts of the case and the extent of the defendant’s deceit and her 
efforts to conceal it.  
6 Contributory negligence 
As noted in Amaltal Corporation Ltd v Mahura Corporation,268 the House of Lords 
has confirmed that contributory negligence no longer applies in the context of deceit. 
Therefore, in New Zealand a defendant would be unable to successfully plead 
contributory negligence if they believed, for example, that the plaintiff suspected that 
they had another sexual partner at the time of the child’s conception.269  
7 Time Limitations  
Finally, deceit claims brought in New Zealand courts are subject to the Limitation Act 
2010, although exceptions can be made to the limitation period in cases of fraud.
 270  
D Proving the elements of negligent misstatement 
As demonstrated, it may be difficult to prove all the elements of deceit. This section 
briefly considers whether negligent misstatement may be an alternative remedy, 
drawing on the case of MacDonald v Gray in which Wisbey CDJ concluded that the 
defendant was liable in negligent misstatement as opposed to deceit. Comments made 
by the High Court in Magill in regards to whether a duty of care is owed between 
spouses are also considered. Finally, the defence of volenti non fit injura is briefly 
discussed.  
1 The maker of a statement concerning the paternity of a child owes a duty of care 
to persons who they are closely and proximately connected with 
In MacDonald, Wisbey DCJ concluded that the defendant was closely and 
proximately connected with the plaintiff because she was his sexual partner, 
concluding:
271
 
 Because of the special relationship that existed between the parties as sexual partners, 
 there was a duty of care on the defendant not to advise the plaintiff that he was 
 responsible for her pregnancy if the position could be otherwise. A false assertion, 
 particularly if maintained over a period of time, had the capacity to result in 
 foreseeable damage. 
 
In contrast, in Magill the High Court held by majority that the defendant had no duty 
of care when making statements concerning the paternity of the child to the plaintiff 
in the context of marriage, as such a duty would inherently impose a duty to disclose 
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an extra-marital affair. Because the Court concluded there was no legal basis for a 
duty to disclose an extra-marital affair there could be no general duty of care in 
regards to making statements about paternity between spouses.
272
 
2 The maker of the statement intends the person to rely on the statement for a 
particular purpose 
See the previous discussion on intention in regards to deceit in section C3. 
Unfortunately, the defendant’s intention is not specifically identified in MacDonald. 
3 The person does rely on the statement for a particular purpose  
See the previous discussion on reliance in regards to deceit in section C4. Again, 
reliance is not specifically identified in MacDonald. 
4 The person suffers loss as a consequence of their reliance 
See the previous discussion on damage in regards to deceit in section C5. This section 
includes discussion of the damages awarded in MacDonald.   
5 Volenti non fit injuria 
A person who has voluntarily assumed the risk of harm occasioned by a breach of a 
duty by the defendant is barred from making a successful claim as the maxim “volenti 
non fit injura” applies.273 In order for a person to be held to have assumed the risk it 
must be shown that the person had full knowledge of the risk and freely and 
voluntarily accepted it.274 The onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff 
assumed the risk of that harm.275 As these are stringent conditions, the defence rarely 
succeeds.276  
 
In cases of misattributed paternity the defendant would have to prove that the plaintiff 
knew they were not the defendant’s only sexual partner and perhaps also that the 
defendant was not using contraception with the other sexual partner. This would be a 
very difficult requirement to satisfy as in most cases where the parties are in a 
relationship the plaintiff will have been completely unaware that he is not the 
defendant’s only sexual partner. Even if he was aware of this fact it would be rare for 
him to fully accept the risk, instead it is likely that he will attempt to clarify the 
paternity of the child with the defendant.   
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6 Contributory negligence 
This could be pleaded by the defendant although as with the defence of volenti non fit 
injura, it may be difficult to prove because in most cases the plaintiff will have been 
unaware that he was not the defendant’s only sexual partner. Accordingly, in 
MacDonald the defence was rejected.
277
 
7 Time limitations 
See the previous discussion on time limitations in regards to deceit in section C7. 
E Conclusions on proving the elements of deceit and negligent misstatement 
If a deceit or negligent misstatement claim were to come before a New Zealand court 
there is a range of guidance that could be drawn on from A v B, the three Magill 
judgments and MacDonald to determine whether each of the elements have been 
proven on the facts. In regards to a claim for deceit, the greatest difficulty a plaintiff 
may face is proving a chain of causation between the specific representation, reliance 
and loss as a result of the reliance. The type of damages that are appropriate to award 
could also be a major issue.  
 
In regards to a claim for negligent misstatement, it may be difficult for a married 
plaintiff to argue that they were owed a duty of care by the defendant when making 
statements concerning paternity as this could be seen as creating a corresponding duty 
to disclose an extra-marital affair. However, if the parties were not married and 
therefore no extra-marital affair occurred, it may be easier to argue a duty of care was 
owed. While the outcome of a New Zealand claim will ultimately depend on the 
particular facts, it is possible that all the elements of deceit or negligent misstatement 
could be proven.  
F Application of deceit and negligent misstatement to misattributed paternity 
In determining whether a claim should succeed, some courts have simply determined 
whether all the elements of the tort have been proven in order to determine liability 
without considering whether the application of the tort is appropriate. However, other 
courts have considered whether, as a matter of law, deceit or negligent misstatement 
claims can be brought in the context of misattributed paternity or whether there are 
public policy reasons that justify a bar on such claims. In this section the various 
approaches are considered and comments are then made on the approach a New 
Zealand court may adopt. 
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1 England 
P v B (Paternity: Damages for Deceit)
278
 was the first deceit claim for misattributed 
paternity to come before a court in England. In deciding the preliminary question of 
whether the tort of deceit can be applied in a domestic context as opposed to a 
commercial context, the judge held that there was no authority which denied the 
application of the tort and held that is has a general and flexible application.
279
 He 
considered that because torts of negligence and trespass to the person applied in a 
domestic context it would be anomalous to except deceit and rejected an argument 
that such claims interfere with private domestic relationships, commenting:
280
 
 I do not think that liability for deceit is an undesirable interference by the law in the 
 domestic relations of a man and a woman. Actions for deceit between couples will in 
 practice be commenced only when their relationship has broken down. An action in 
 deceit will not cause the breakdown of the relationship: more likely, the breakdown in 
 the relationship will be the consequence of the fraud. 
Overall, he considered that the law should encourage honesty between couples, rather 
than condone dishonesty and that to accede to arguments for confining the tort would 
be to deny a remedy in cases where it was needed.
281
 On that basis, he concluded that 
deceit claims for misattributed paternity could be brought in a between former 
“cohabitating couples.”282 
 
However, he recognised that there should be several limitations to the application of 
deceit in the context of misattributed paternity, for example, he recognised that it 
would be inappropriate to award damages if to do so conflicted with orders 
concerning child support payments made in the Family Division of the High Court.
283
 
Essentially, it would be an abuse of process to attempt to re-litigate the question by 
means of an action for deceit. 
 
The reasoning in P v B (Paternity: Damages for Deceit) was subsequently followed in 
A v B. The Judge also rejected a “floodgates argument” that if the action was allowed 
to proceed and was successful, it would be followed by a flood of other similar cases. 
The Judge commented that: 
284
 
 If this is a cause of action for which justice requires a remedy, then it is right that a 
 remedy be granted, and I am unmoved by the thought that other similar cases may 
 come forward. 
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He also noted that there had only been one other English claim, one Australian claim 
and a few in the United States so at present “the anxiety of a flood of similar cases 
seems to be somewhat over-stated.”285 
2 Australia 
In the first instance the County Court Judge in Magill did not consider the 
applicability of the tort of deceit, instead he simply determined whether all the 
elements of the tort had been proven on the facts. On appeal to the Court of Appeal 
Eames J considered the reasoning in P v B and noted that while it was unnecessary to 
conclude on the torts application as all the elements had not been proven causing the 
claim to fail, he could see “no impediment” to its application to representations 
regarding paternity. He further stated:286 
 Whilst there may be good reason to discourage traumatic litigation such as has arisen 
 in this case, it is not the function of this Court to apply social considerations so as to 
 deny a  party a remedy which is otherwise open to him or her. The respondent's 
 motive for bringing this proceeding is irrelevant. A remedy in damages for a wrong 
 done may provide not merely recompense for financial loss, but also, in the eyes of 
 the claimant, an element of punishment for the wrong done, and vindication of the 
 rights of the party wronged. There is, therefore, nothing unique to the tort of deceit if 
 it was being applied by the representee with motives of personal vindication and of 
 punishment of the alleged wrongdoer.  
 
On appeal to the High Court the majority disagreed with Eames J with five of the six 
judges concluding that the defendant was entitled to immunity from suit. In a joint 
judgment, Gummon, Kirby and Crennan JJ held that deceit did not apply to false 
representations made during a marriage about paternity or about an extramarital affair. 
This was for two reasons. Firstly, there was an existing statutory framework that 
facilitated the accurate determination of paternity, and the Government had recently 
passed legislation which provided that the determination of fault between spouses, 
including inquiry into their extra-marital sexual conduct, is no longer the province of 
the law. An action for deceit would cut across this comprehensive statutory 
framework, and accordingly, it was not appropriate for the common law to develop in 
this way.
287
  
 
Secondly, there was a ‘mantle of privacy’ which protected sexual conduct within a 
marriage from the scrutiny by the law. There was no legal or equitable obligation on a 
person to disclose an extra-marital sexual relationship to their spouse during the 
course of a marriage, and it was inappropriate to assess the parties conduct by 
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reference to bargaining transactions, to which the tort of deceit was typically 
associated.
288
 However, the Court recognised that tort actions can arise between 
spouses and that a duty of disclosure exists in certain contractual negotiations, and if 
one spouse has a sexually transmitted disease. It noted these actions are allowed 
because contractual negotiations can be equated with commercial transactions which 
are a province of the law, and the transmission of sexually transmitted disease carries 
the risk of physical harm, therefore both are valid exceptions.
289
  
 
Hayne J agreed with the majority, concluding that there could be no satisfactory 
application of an objective and generalized standard of conduct to a very particular 
and personal relationship in which it was the parties themselves who would mold the 
way in which their relationship was ordered and conducted.
290
 Gleeson J was satisfied 
that in principle deceit could apply to representations regarding paternity, noting that 
false representations could be made in a variety of contexts, some of which may be 
closely linked to property or financial undertakings. He considered that while the 
application of deceit to marital relations is not impossible, and there are no rigidly 
defined zones of exclusion, attempts to construct legal rights and obligations in 
unsuitable environments must fail.
291
  
 
In the only dissenting judgment, Heydon J agreed with Gleeson J that in principle an 
action in deceit could lie in cases of misattributed paternity as tort actions were 
generally available between spouses. On this basis there was no good reason to create 
an anomaly for deceit, endorsing the principle from Nocton v Lord Ashburton
292
 that 
honesty is a duty of universal obligation.  
 
Finally, Wisbey CDJ did not consider the application of deceit or negligent 
misstatement to paternity representations in MacDonald, instead he solely considered 
whether the elements of the torts had been proven. 
3 Canada 
Deceit and negligent misstatement were both pleaded in Saul v Himel
293
 although the 
application of torts was decisively rejected. The Judge held that the plaintiff’s action 
“offended public policy” and that marriage is still a private domain so the public, 
through the judicial system, should not be involved in scrutinizing the behavior of 
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spouses in private matters.
294
 This conclusion was upheld on appeal
295
 and 
subsequently followed in D. (D.R.) v G. (S.E.)
296
 and Rees v Proulx.
297
 More recently, 
the opposite view was taken in Thompson v Thompson
298
 where the Court held, as a 
preliminary matter, that a claim in deceit could be brought between former spouses 
because to bar such claims would be tantamount to the Court directing that fraud is 
condoned in cases of misattributed paternity.
299
  
4 New Zealand 
England and Australia have taken very different approaches to the application of 
deceit to cases of misattributed paternity.
300
 In England, allowing deceit claims in the 
context of misattributed paternity is regarded as a natural development of tort law, 
whereas in Australia, public policy reasons are regarded as significant enough to 
justify a bar on deceit claims in most circumstances. The position in Canada was 
similar to that in Australia until recently, although as no guidance can be drawn from 
Thompson, the Canadian position is not discussed further. On that basis, the main 
question for consideration is whether a New Zealand Court will adopt the English or 
Australia approach when a deceit or negligent misstatement claim comes before it. 
 
As there is no general statutory bar in New Zealand on married or unmarried couples 
suing each other in tort in a domestic context,301 public policy reasons are the only 
barrier to the success of a deceit or negligent misstatement claim where the defendant 
has successfully proven all the required elements. In the only New Zealand 
commentary on the application of tort law to cases of misattributed paternity, Todd 
argues that the two public policy reasons given by the majority in Magill, or very 
similar reasons, arguably apply with force in New Zealand. Therefore, New Zealand 
courts are likely to follow the Australian approach.
302
 These two reasons are analysed 
further in this chapter to determine whether they are robust or require further 
consideration. 
                                                 
294
 Ibid, at [20]. 
295
 Saul v Himel 1996 CarswellOnt 1369 Ont. S.C.J.). 
296
 D. (D.R.) v G. (S.E.) 2001 CarswellOnt 299 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
297
 Rees v Proulx 2001 CarswellOnt 4637 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
298
 Thompson v Thompson [2003] A.J. No. 1577 (Alta. Q.B.). 
299
 Ibid, at [30]. A brief reference to this judgment was made in Raju v Kumar 2006 BCSC 439 
although the author has not been able to obtain a copy of the judgment as it was unreported. 
300
 Furthermore, the approach adopted in MacDonald v Gray could be regarded as inconsistent with the 
Magill High Court judgment. 
301
 Relationship Property Act 1976, s 51. The section provides that each of the parties to a marriage or 
civil union shall have the like right of action in tort against the other as if they were not married or in a 
civil union. 
302
 Stephen Todd “Review: Tort” (2007) NZLR 773; Stephen Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand 
(5
th
 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009). 
84 Chapter 7 Misattributed paternity tort claims  
 
 
(1) Tort claims for misattributed paternity cut across a ‘no fault’ statutory 
framework concerning divorce and the accurate determination of paternity  
 
Todd argues that the New Zealand statutory framework on divorce and paternity is 
similar to that in Australia as it is non-fault based. More specifically he argues that 
legislation concerning the dissolution of marriage,
303
 child support,
304
 property,
305
 and 
care of children
306
 all:
 307
 
 …seek so far as possible to resolve disputes and agreements between the parties 
 without allocating blame and responsibility. The very process of investigation into 
 matters  of fault – “digging up the dirt” – is seen as contrary to the welfare and best 
 interests of the child. 
 
Generally speaking the New Zealand statutory framework is non-fault based, although 
it is questionable that tort claims should be barred on the basis that ‘digging up the 
dirt’ is contrary to the welfare and best interests of the child. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, court proceedings concerning misattributed paternity are inherently 
about ‘digging up the dirt’ in order to determine who is the biological father of the 
child. Such proceedings are not regarded as contrary to the welfare and best interests 
of the child. This is evident in the fact that courts have ordered children to undergo 
parentage tests because it considers that it is in the welfare and best interests of the 
child to know who their biological father is.308 It is also significant that there is a 
statutory provision that allows a non-biological father to apply for a declaration of 
non-paternity as this further supports the notion that the statutory framework 
encourages truth about paternity. Furthermore, if there is a dispute about the paternity 
of a child it is an offence to pretend to be the biological parent of a child and take a 
parentage test on behalf of someone else, or provide a ‘stand in’ child in the place of 
the child who should actually be taking the test.
309
 Therefore family law legislation 
does allocate blame and responsibility in scenarios involving misattributed paternity 
where there is a deliberate intent to deceive. For these reasons, tort claims could be 
regarded as consistent with the existing statutory framework, as opposed to cutting 
across it. 
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Secondly, it could be argued that tort claims do not cut across the existing statutory 
framework, rather they are entirely separate and exist concurrently alongside it. They 
are not a ‘second bite to the cherry’ as the plaintiff is not attempting to re-litigate 
previous Family Court proceedings concerning the parties’ separation and the 
paternity of the child in order to have the outcome changed. Indeed the success of a 
tort claim will have no impact on orders previously made by the Family Court. In 
addition, tort claims have a different purpose to statutory proceedings. The main 
purpose of statutory proceedings is to resolve the legal status of the parties whereas 
the sole purpose of tort claims is to award compensation. As there is no statutory 
mechanism to award compensation for ‘damage’ caused by misattributed paternity, 
tort claims to seek compensation therefore arguably do not cut across the existing 
statutory framework.  
 
However, as Todd explains, there two clear instances when tort claims do cut across 
the existing statutory framework and should therefore be barred. Firstly, where the 
plaintiff seeks to have child support payments refunded through an award of damages. 
This would be a clear abuse of process as the Child Support Act 1991 provides a 
comprehensive framework for the payment of child support and specifically provides 
for the refund of child support payments.310 Secondly, claims should be barred if the 
plaintiff seeks to use tort proceedings to delay relationship property proceedings. 
Section 51(2) of the Property Relationships Act 1976 provides the courts with a 
discretionary power to stay proceedings between spouses or de facto couples if they 
are of no substantial benefit to either party, are vexatious, or the question in issue 
could be more conveniently resolved under the Act. In Ross v Ross311 a husband’s 
defamation action against his wife was barred on the basis that it was in the interests 
of the parties and the children of the marriage that the financial and parental issues 
between them be resolved as soon as possible, and not delayed by the tort proceedings 
directly or indirectly.312 Accordingly, if a deceit or negligent misstatement claim is 
lodged while relationship property proceedings are underway and delays those 
proceedings, it should be stayed.   
 
(2) There is a ‘mantle of privacy’ which protects sexual conduct within a marriage 
(and other long term relationships short of marriage) from scrutiny by the law  
 
While this could be regarded as a valid public policy reason for barring such claims, it 
also creates numerous anomalies. The High Court of Australia has acknowledged that 
there is not a mantle of privacy over sexual conduct within a marriage where a person 
                                                 
310
 Child Support Act 1991, s 207. 
311
 Ross v Ross HC Auckland CP 219-SD000, 27 March 2001. 
312
 Ibid, at [16].  
86 Chapter 7 Misattributed paternity tort claims  
 
fails to disclose that they are HIV positive.
313
 In such circumstances, a spouse is not 
barred from bringing a battery claim as the Court considered there is a duty to disclose 
because failure to do so results in harm. Similarly, in cases of misattributed paternity 
there is also a failure to disclose important information that arguably results in harm. 
The High Court distinguished cases of potential HIV transmission on the basis that the 
harm is physical, although as previously discussed, ‘harm’ in the context of tort 
claims is not solely limited to physical harm. Indeed, the Australian High Court has 
previously held that the cost of raising an unplanned child is harm.
314
 The High 
Court’s conclusion that spouses should be able to bring battery claims is also 
inconsistent with the Court’s conclusion that tort claims should not cut across the ‘no 
fault’ statutory framework.315 
 
Secondly, concluding that there is a mantle of privacy over sexual conduct within a 
marriage but not over sexual conduct within a long or short-term relationship creates 
an additional anomaly as it bars certain people from bringing claims and not others. A 
male who was married to the child’s mother for 20 years would be barred from 
bringing a claim under Magill but a male who had a one off sexual encounter with the 
child’s mother could potentially bring a claim.316 This appears illogical as the level of 
psychological and financial harm suffered is likely to be higher for a male who was 
married to the child’s mother (particularly if married for a long period of time) than a 
man who had a fleeting sexual relationship with the child’s mother. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that barring claims depending on the relationship status of the parties 
could amount to prima facie discrimination on the grounds of marital status under the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.317 
 
In conclusion, the public policy grounds for barring claims in Magill should be 
considered although for the reasons given, a New Zealand Court should not readily 
adopt these grounds without further consideration of them in a New Zealand context. 
However, there are two clear instances where a tort claim should be barred in New 
Zealand. Firstly, where the plaintiff seeks to recover previously made child support 
payments, and secondly, where the plaintiff has lodged a claim to deliberately delay 
relationship property proceedings.  
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G Tort claims for non-consensual and deceitful paternity  
While no deceit or negligent misstatement claims in regards to non-consensual or 
deceitful natural paternity have emerged in the common law jurisdiction, a significant 
number have been brought in the United States for false representations about 
contraception318 and infertility.319 There are also two reported cases in which the 
plaintiff argued that the defendant ‘stole’ their sperm in the course of oral sex and 
subsequently inseminated the sperm without their knowledge to conceive the child.
320
 
While some courts have accepted the elements of the torts could be proven, none of 
the claims made thus far have been successful as all have been barred on public policy 
grounds. 
 
Tort liability could also arise in the context of non-consensual artificial paternity. If a 
woman deceived a hospital or medical clinic into allowing her to use a former 
partner’s semen or embryos created using his semen without his consent, the former 
partner could bring an action in injurious falsehood. Possible conversion or 
negligence claims could also arise as the Court of Appeal in England recently held 
that males have property rights in samples of their sperm that are frozen and stored by 
a third party.321 Although less likely, property rights in embryos may also be 
recognised in future which could result in further claims.   
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VIII Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has proven that non-consensual, deceitful, and misattributed 
paternity is a modern reality that has serious practical and legal consequences for all 
parties involved, but particularly for the father and the child. Furthermore, these types 
of paternity do not sit comfortably within the current legal framework on paternity 
which is too rigid, unclear, or outdated to resolve the issues that arise, and in some 
instances, result in inequitable outcomes. Therefore, changes must be made. 
 
Eleven recommendations have been provided throughout this dissertation. They are 
summarised as follows: 
 
(1) A new provision, s 18A, should be inserted into Part 2 of the Status of 
Children Act 1969 to determine the legal status of a male whose semen or 
embryos containing his semen were used in an AHR procedure without his 
consent. 
(2) The Governor-General should pass an order in council in accordance with s 
76(1)(ii) of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 to 
provide regulations on the use or destruction of in vitro fertilised embryos in 
cases where one party from whom such a gamete or embryo has been obtained 
withdraws consent to any course of action. 
(3) Deception used to bring about the conception of a child should be added as a 
ground for a departure order under s 105 of the Child Support Act 1991. 
(4) Section 54 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 should be amended to allow 
the Family Court to order parentage testing. 
(5) Section 57 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 should be amended to give the 
Family Court a discretionary power to issue a warrant authorising certain 
people to take steps to enforce an order issued under s 54. 
(6) Insert new s 57A into the Family Proceedings Act 1980 which provides 
requirements in regards to the execution of a warrant issued under s 57. 
(7) Insert new s 57B into the Family Proceedings Act 1980 which provides that it 
is an offence to resist or obstruct the execution of a warrant made under s 57. 
(8) The Government should develop standards and accreditation of laboratories 
offering DNA parentage testing in New Zealand, with particular attention to 
the accuracy of testing and verification of the identity of samples and persons. 
(9) Amend s 10 of the Status of Children Act 1969 to allow an eligible person to 
apply directly for a declaration of non-paternity. 
(10) Amend s 47 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 (and delete s 51) to allow a 
male to apply for a paternity order and to allow an eligible person (including a 
male) to apply for a non-paternity order. 
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(11) Amend s 10(5) of the Status of Children Act 1969 so that both the High Court 
and Family Court have the same discretionary jurisdiction to grant 
declarations of paternity or non-paternity.  
 
It is also concluded that deceit and negligent misstatement claims for misattributed 
could be successfully pleaded in New Zealand. However, such claims may be barred 
on the public policy grounds identified in Magill. While public policy grounds for 
barring claims need to be considered, New Zealand courts should not adopt the 
approach of the High Court of Australia without carefully considering the Court’s 
reasoning in a New Zealand context. However, as discussed, there are two instances 
where claims should be barred. Firstly, where the plaintiff seeks to recover child 
support payments, as the proper course is to use s 207 of the Child Support Act 1991, 
or where the plaintiff is attempting to delay relationship property proceedings. In 
these two instances, claims are an inherent abuse of process. 
 
Finally, although this dissertation provides a number of practical recommendations it 
is not based on the assumption that it provides all the answers to the complex legal 
issues that arise as a result of non-consensual, deceitful and misattributed paternity. 
These issues concern complex aspects of human behaviour and are therefore 
inherently difficult to resolve. In addition, they concern societal values which are 
constantly changing. Ongoing consideration of these issues is therefore needed. 
Indeed some of the topics discussed in this dissertation, namely child support,
322
 and 
the role of the Family Court,
323
 are currently under review. Hopefully, the 
recommendations stimulate further discussion and research within both the academic 
and political community in New Zealand and overseas.  
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